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1 Beliefs about Useful Learning
Educational assessment is a normative endeavor. The ideal 
assessment both reflects and reinforces educational goals that 
society deems valuable. One fundamental goal of education is 
to prepare students to act independently in the world—which is 
to say, make good choices. It follows that an ideal assessment 
would measure how well we are preparing students to do so. 
The argument of this report is that current assessments, which 
primarily focus on how much knowledge and skills students 
have accrued, are inadequate. Choice, rather than knowledge, 
should be the interpretative frame within which learning assess-
ments are organized. Digital technologies make this possible, 
because interactive assessments can evaluate students in a con-
text of choosing whether, what, how, and when to learn.
In education, most people see choice as a catalyst for learning. 
For instance, giving students choices can increase their motiva-
tion and learning (Iyengar and Lepper 1999). Choice is also 
important for learning, if only because students need to experi-
ence choices in the protected atmosphere of education so they 
can learn how to handle them before becoming independent.
The current assertion starts differently. It examines why 
choice should be viewed as the outcome of learning and not 
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solely an instructional ingredient to improve learning. We con-
tend that choice should be the interpretative framework for 
understanding learning outcomes. To achieve this reorientation 
in how people think about learning, assessment provides a pow-
erful lever. Assessments shape the public mind, and everything 
else flows from that.
Assessment is not a sexy topic. It is tolerated as a necessary 
nuisance. This is the dulling fog that comes from accepting the 
premise that what exists must exist. Do not underestimate the 
power of assessments or the degree to which they have shaped 
how you think about learning.
Formulated in 1956, Benjamin Bloom’s taxonomy of educa-
tional outcomes is still arguably one of the most influential 
frameworks for the design of instruction. It describes a pyramid 
of the following order, going from bottom to top: memory 
(called “knowledge” back then), comprehension, application, 
analysis, synthesis, and evaluation. Bloom’s taxonomy was 
designed by a committee as an assessment framework, not an 
instructional one. It is not based on learning or pedagogical 
theory. Yet in the way that assessments always manage to do, it 
has commanded the instructional enterprise. Based on the pyra-
mid, many people believe that students must first learn from the 
bottom of the pyramid (memorize) before engaging in higher-
order thinking near the top (evaluate). This belief is wrong. Most 
people would recognize this if they could reclaim their common 
sense from the grip of assessment. For example, comprehension 
improves the formation of memories (Bransford and Johnson 
1972), so making memories a prerequisite for comprehension 
does not work well. Similarly, having students learn a new topic 
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in an application context is a great way to help them simultane-
ously learn the facts and evaluate their applications.
People have beliefs about learning that are mistaken. Current 
classroom and high-stakes assessments are largely responsible 
for this situation, because they send the wrong message about 
what matters. Teachers may tell students about the importance 
of persistence, critical thinking, interest development, and a 
host of other keys to a successful life. But tests provide the 
empirical evidence that students use to decide what is truly 
valued. If an assessment focuses on the retrieval and procedural 
application of narrow skills and facts, this is what students will 
think counts as useful learning. How can they not? It is the basis 
for promotion and approbation. By changing assessments to 
concentrate on choices, we should be able to improve beliefs 
about what constitutes useful learning.
There is a befuddling but extremely strong correlation in 
the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study— 
an assessment taken by students around the world (http:// 
timssandpirls.bc.edu). It is meant to help nations decide their 
standing. The study’s actionable information is at the level of 
national policy rather than teachers and students. The odd find-
ing is that the students of the nations that do the best on the 
test also exhibit the least “liking” of mathematics and science 
(e.g., Shen 2002). The better a nation scores on the math or sci-
ence tests, the less interest the children there have in pursuing 
math or science. Nobody knows exactly why the negative corre-
lation is so strong. There may be some statistical oddity that 
involves averaging individuals to compare nations (Robinson 
1950). There are also more substantive possibilities. One is that 
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students who do the best on these tests spend a lot of time 
learning with testlike questions. They interpret these questions 
as markers of what it means to have learned in science and 
mathematics. They do not like the vision that from their test-
based vantage, learning is primarily an act of replicating what 
they have been told. It makes sense that they would not like 
math and science, despite doing well. They have missed the 
generative and contributive aspects of learning. Under this 
interpretation, rather than helping to prepare students for 
future learning in science and math, current assessments are 
propelling students to choose not to learn these domains.
Distortions of what counts as useful learning suffuse US cul-
ture. Our greatest fear is that those fortunate enough to have 
the resources to guide education may also have distorted visions 
of learning. What could be worse than creating educational 
technologies that become increasingly efficient at teaching the 
wrong thing? Successful people have gained many implicit les-
sons about what it took for them to achieve their successes, 
often accompanied by narratives of passion and perseverance. 
Yet these same people are at risk of supporting learning environ-
ments that ignore those lessons, and instead teach to outcomes 
that seem mostly important for standardized and end-of-chap-
ter tests. Such is the sway of assessments.
The aim of assessment should be to advance the goals of soci-
ety rather than misrepresent them. With new developments in 
technology, it should be possible to advance goals that were 
beyond the reach of prior assessments. To date, this has not 
been the case. Howard Wainer (2010, 17) argues that “the prom-
ise of [computerized testing] has yet to be fully realized. So far, 
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when it has been applied, it has been used as a mechanical 
horse, not doing much more than could have been done with 
paper and pencil testing except that it is faster (a little) and 
more expensive (a lot).” We believe it is possible to do better, 
and the following is our plan.
In chapter 2, we situate our discussion in the context of new 
technologies that make it possible for choice to become the core 
of assessment (and not in the degraded sense of multiple-choice 
tests). We also provide an anchoring example of a computer-
ized, choice-based assessment. In part II, we turn to theoretical 
matters to help unseat current beliefs about what we should be 
assessing. Chapter 3 maintains that choice is what most of the 
stakeholders in education care about, despite the fact that they 
often talk in terms of knowledge and skills. To make room for 
choice-based assessment, chapter 4 tries to clarify why knowl-
edge-based assessments are a mismatch for the aims of educa-
tion. The chapter highlights the fact that knowledge has not 
always been the frame of assessment and that the current 
emphasis on knowledge has made it difficult to connect assess-
ments to outcomes beyond knowledge. Chapter 5 continues the 
argument by focusing on the static nature of knowledge assess-
ments, and it offers an alternative model of a dynamic assess-
ment that evaluates learning in action.
In part III, we turn to more practical matters. Chapter 6 pro-
vides several concrete cases of choice-based assessments that 
reveal what knowledge-based assessments cannot—for example, 
persistence after failure. Chapter 7 considers a related practical 
matter: twenty-first-century standards. The chapter supplies a 
pair of organizing frames that can integrate choice outcomes 
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into standards while avoiding laundry lists of goals, which can 
leave assessment designers without guiding principles.
In part IV, we turn to matters of practice. We concentrate on 
the practice of designing assessments. Chapter 8 provides a brief 
tutorial on technical aspects of assessment, including constructs, 
validity, and reliability. Reliability, in particular, is problematic, 
because it presumes a stable construct, whereas education pre-
supposes a trajectory of change. Chapter 9 contends that assess-
ments would be more useful if we loosen the grip of some past 
approaches, so that assessments can be designed to evaluate 
learning experiences rather than just individual student achieve-
ment. Also, new computational developments make it possible 
to handle much more complex views of learning, but this 
depends on exploratory data mining as opposed to hypothesis 
testing. Chapter 10 lays out a research and development agenda 
for creating choice-based assessments. It includes the descrip-
tion of new platforms for democratizing and crowdsourcing the 
design and evaluation of assessments, along with several meth-
odological strategies for making headway.
In part V, we turn to the most difficult aspect of assessment. 
Chapter 11 considers issues of fairness, where there is a delicate 
balance between encouraging and forcing good choices. In fact, 
before we move forward in our argument, we should clarify 
what we mean when we use the term choice. We take it as foun-
dational that a primary goal of education is to help students 
develop aspirations and understandings so they can make 
choices that maximize their chances of succeeding within and 
beyond school, and we believe, therefore, that choice should be 
at the heart of assessment. Yet we recognize that not all choices 
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are in the purview of education. Choice assessments should not 
be a backdoor way to enforce beliefs that fall outside the domain 
of publicly sponsored education (such as whether students make 
the “correct” choice about a political or religious matter). 
Instead, choice-based assessments should indicate whether stu-
dents can learn and adapt in productive ways. Our discussion of 
choice-based assessments thus refers to learning-relevant choices 
such as how and what to learn, not all choices. Nevertheless, 
measuring choices—the stuff of agency and freedom—raises dif-
ficult questions about the province of education in shaping and 
assessing children. Choice-based assessments bring issues of fair-
ness into helpful relief. Chapter 12 summarizes our argument.

2 Enter Technology
Many new technologies are about choice. When browsing the 
Web for information, each click can be considered a choice 
about learning. When deciding which online sources to trust 
and which friends to consult, people are making learning 
choices. When using scientific simulations, people make 
choices about sequences of settings that will yield the most tell-
ing results. There is a good match between current digital tech-
nologies and choice-based assessments. But we are getting 
ahead of ourselves. Before digging into the argument for choice 
as the interpretative framework for learning outcomes, we want 
to preview the general significance of technology for assess-
ment. Digital technologies make it possible to teach and assess 
in new ways, and the lure of computerized efficiency can serve 
as a Trojan horse for delivering these new ways of teaching and 
assessing.
Historically, technology has always had a powerful influence 
on instruction and assessment. To take a remote example, the 
Dark Ages had limited technologies for information storage. 
Information therefore was carefully transmitted from teacher to 
pupil—a flame from one candle to the next. Monks painstak-
ingly transcribed manuscripts letter for letter. One can imagine 
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that assessments of monks largely involved their abilities to 
reproduce what came before without error, and a good deal of 
instruction also focused on errorless knowledge transmission.
The assessment enterprise has always been quick to adopt the 
efficiencies of new technologies—perhaps quicker than the 
instructional enterprise. Most people born before the twenty-
first century are familiar with the no. 2 pencil and bubble forms. 
The bubble form was a technology that rapidly permeated the 
assessment enterprise. Professor Ben D. Wood, who helped 
design the bubble form and the IBM 805 that scored it, used the 
resulting income to endow graduate student fellowships at 
Teachers College, Columbia University. More recently, the 
bubble form has been replaced by fully automated computer-
ized testing, which can collect, analyze, and transmit data the 
moment a test is over (or even sooner).
Ideally, in the rush to embrace more efficient assessment 
technologies, new forms of assessments can be introduced that 
influence education in productive ways. There is some evidence 
that this is already happening. As we describe next, there are 
technologies that embed assessments into instruction so that 
there is no need to “close the store to take inventory.” There are 
also promising instances of technologies that can support non-
linear curricula and assessment, so that students can make 
choices about what and how to learn.
These examples, which we describe below, all depend on 
large-scale environments that require many hours of interaction 
before any useful information can be gathered. To serve a broad 
range of goals, assessments need to be more nimble. And to 
show how this is possible, we conclude this chapter with an 
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anchoring case of a digital choice-based assessment designed to 
assess critical thinking. It may not be what you expect in a test.
How New Technologies Can Remove Earlier Efficiency Constraints
Many assessment regimes are inefficient, because time spent on 
the test is not time spent on learning. One key improvement 
fashioned by technology is the ability to integrate assessment 
seamlessly into the process of learning itself. Cognitive tutors 
provide an excellent example (Koedinger and Anderson 1997). 
These programs monitor how students are solving problems on 
the computer. The assessments are embedded within the prob-
lem-solving tasks themselves. Much like a tutor observing how 
a pupil is solving a problem, the computer system adjusts the 
instruction based on a model of what the student can do so far. 
In this way, assessments can provide useful feedback to inform, 
rather than compete with, learning opportunities.
Another new way to implement assessments without displac-
ing the time spent on learning is with video games. Good video 
games offer massive amounts of feedback that players can use to 
improve their performance, and the consequence of doing well 
is that new learning opportunities open up (e.g., by leveling 
up). James Gee (2003) has made the compelling case that video 
games are a great model for effective instruction and assess-
ment. In good video games, assessment is an integral part of the 
design, and it is built into the core mechanics of the learning. 
David Shaffer (2006) further uses games to complement nonvir-
tual experiences, so it becomes possible to use the game as an 
assessment of the combined experiences.
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A second important promise of technology is that it can alle-
viate management demands. The result of this promise is the 
possibility of nonlinear formats of instruction that allow for stu-
dent exploration and choice about what as well as how to learn. 
To understand the significance of this development, it is crucial 
to appreciate what it can replace.
Currently, most classroom instruction follows a strict, prede-
termined linear sequence that precludes significant student 
choice about learning. School textbooks rarely ask students to 
choose how or what to learn, even when students are taking an 
elective course. The assumption is that these decisions should 
be left to experts, who can make more efficient learning choices 
than a novice could. There is merit to this assumption, but the 
price is too high when it removes all choice. For instance, the 
skill of time management cannot be taught effectively in 
schools where activities are regimented to the minute and 
enforced by bells. There are few opportunities for students to 
make choices and learn about time management in school. 
(Therefore, parents often use homework to teach their children 
time management in a context of learning.) Similarly, if stu-
dents do not have opportunities to make choices about learn-
ing, they will not learn how to choose well (unless they gain 
such experiences through informal learning).
A predetermined linear curriculum helps to avert the chal-
lenge of monitoring many different learning trajectories. High 
school teachers can have roughly 150 students per day, which 
means teachers could face the prospect of tracking 150 different 
learning trajectories. It is much easier to track the position 
of each student against a single trajectory as specified by the 
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curriculum. Even in the context of individualized computer 
instruction, it has been common to assume a single, idealized 
trajectory. The cognitive tutors, like all forms of programmed 
instruction, presuppose an ordered sequence of learning, so it is 
possible to keep track of students and then move them forward 
or backward in the sequence depending on their performance.
Newer genres of technologies make it possible to forego a 
linear progression without a concomitant loss of efficiency in 
learning or management. They provide for learner choice while 
still supplying ample opportunities for assessment and learning.
Multiplayer video games like World of Warcraft (http://
us.battle.net/wow/en) include a slate of choices about what to 
do, whom to be, what to learn, and how to learn. Here is a 
sample of the choices available to new players of the World of 
Warcraft at the time of this writing (more options are added fre-
quently). Players choose one of over two hundred Realms in 
which to create their characters (there are four different types of 
Realm, determined by whether or not players are expected to act 
“in character,” and whether or not players are allowed to attack 
each other). They then choose one of two factions (Alliance or 
Horde), one of ten species (Blood Elves, Draenei, Humans, etc.), 
one of two genders (male or female), and one of ten careers 
(Druid, Hunter, Shaman, etc.). The players must then choose 
their appearances from among thousands of possible configura-
tions—and all this is before the game has even begun. 
Once the players bring their characters into the world, they 
choose their professions, talents, friends, enemies, quests, 
worldviews, and goals. They then embark on an open-ended 
adventuring career. Everything that World of Warcraft players 
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learn about how to succeed in the game (which is a lot—it is a 
complex game) is defined by their choices, from the game’s 
setup to whom they interact with online. This profusion of 
choices might seem daunting, but it encourages players to feel a 
real ownership and become strongly invested in their charac-
ters’ success.
Despite the nonlinear format, with players choosing their 
trajectories, these types of choice-rich environments are filled 
with assessments. World of Warcraft is instrumented with 
extremely refined metrics of player preferences, progress, and 
strengths. There are metrics that indicate various powers along 
with levels of accomplishment and access. These metrics are 
clearly available to players through gauges, points, game levels, 
ratings by peers, and so forth. They serve as powerful motivators 
to do even better (Reeves and Read 2009). In this case, assess-
ment and learning are built into an environment of high choice.
Nimble Assessments
The cognitive tutor and full-blown video games are too bulky 
for most assessment purposes. There are advantages to making 
smaller and more nimble environments for assessment. First, 
nimble assessments do not depend on students completing 
many hours of a complex game or instructional sequence before 
it is possible to make any useful assessments.
Second, smaller assessments can target specific choices by 
their design. This is quite different from searching for diagnostic 
patterns amid the millions of possible choice combinations in 
larger open environments.
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Third, building smaller choice-based assessments can be 
within the reach of many, thereby potentially helping to 
increase the democratization of assessment design. As we 
describe later, with the right resources, we can make it so that 
members of the “public” can work on designing their own 
choice-based assessments.
Fourth, multiple smaller assessments make it possible to 
assess the same constellation of choices using several measures 
instead of just one. The results from a single, monolithic assess-
ment are questionable, because they may be due to unknown 
peculiarities of the environment. By using multiple assessments, 
it is possible to mitigate these concerns by showing the general-
ization of student behaviors across multiple environments.
Finally, there is value to having an assessment that can be 
used to compare different learning experiences. In the cases of 
video games, the cognitive tutor, and many embedded assess-
ments, the assessments are locked into a specific model of 
instruction and delivery system. It is oftentimes useful to have 
assessments that stand independently of a specific instructional 
package, so that it is possible to use the assessment to compare 
the effectiveness of different instructional models and learning 
experiences.
An Example of a Choice-Based Assessment
A modest illustration of a nimble, choice-based assessment 
comes from our work on choicelets. Choicelets take the form of 
short and (hopefully) engaging games that students want to 
complete. To complete the game, each choicelet requires some 
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learning, and we keep a log of students’ choices relevant to that 
learning. Different choicelets are designed to assess specific con-
stellations of choices relevant to learning.
In the current example, we describe a game called Ohno! Has 
Talent. The game takes the form of a talent show. It is designed 
to measure critical thinking. Critical thinking is the process by 
which people decide what to believe (Norris 1985). Most assess-
ments of critical thinking evaluate reasoning—for instance, the 
ability to recognize when assumptions do not lead to conclu-
sions. Critical thinking assessments are rarely connected to 
learning outcomes. From this narrow vantage point, critical 
thinking gets confused with (deductive) problem solving, on 
the one hand, and brute intelligence, on the other. Here are two 
examples of items drawn from a practice packet for a standard-
ized test of critical thinking (Watson and Glaser 2002). One can 
see that they measure decontextualized deductive reasoning—
something of the sort that lawyers might use on a case that has 
been handed to them.
I. Statement: The proper aim of education in a free society is to 
prepare the individual to make wise decisions. Which of the 
following assumptions are made in the statement?
1. People educated in a free society will not make unwise deci-
sions (Yes/No).
2. Some education systems in our society do not have the 
proper aim (Yes/No).
3. Some kinds of education can help individuals make wise 
decisions (Yes/No).
4. In a society that is not free, the individual cannot make any 
decisions (Yes/No).
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II. Statement: No responsible leader can avoid making difficult 
decisions. Some responsible leaders dislike making difficult decisions. 
Therefore:
1. Some decisions are distasteful to some people (Yes/No).
2. Irresponsible leaders avoid things they dislike (Yes/No).
3. Some responsible leaders do things they dislike doing (Yes/
No).
We thought it might be useful to recast critical thinking in a 
choice-based assessment and regain the broader meaning of 
critical thinking as the process of deciding what to believe. 
Therefore, we assessed the choice to engage in critical thinking 
for the purpose of learning. As will become evident, there are a 
number of differences between our assessment and the critical 
thinking items above. The choice-based assessment, for exam-
ple, occurs in the context of a game on learning about color 
mixing. Making assessments fun should be useful for those who 
would like to examine the effects of informal learning experi-
ences, where it can be difficult to ask visiting learners to com-
plete tests and surveys. Leaving a museum with a test is not 
compelling, but leaving with a pointer to a set of free games 
could be.
Figure 2.1 (plate 1) shows the main interface of the Ohno! Has 
Talent assessment. There are three contestants, who each sing a 
song. The contestants want the overhead lights to beam specific 
colors when they are singing. The students’ task is to mix the 
primary light colors to make the contestants’ preferred color 
beams. Students use the little color buttons near the bottom of 
the figure to mix the light. The music bars just above the but-
tons show the colors that a contestant would like. After the 
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Figure 2.1 (Plate 1)
Ohno! Has Talent: An example of a choice-based assessment for critical 
thinking
Students mix the stage lights to shine colors when the contestants sing. 
The contestant Otter wanted an orange beam, and the student cor-
rectly set the color lights at the bottom to make orange. Most students 
know about mixing primary colors for paint (subtractive color), but 
light depends on a different set of primary colors (additive color). To 
learn the rules of additive color, students have an experiment room in 
the upperright corner, and they have a set of catalogs that show differ-
ent colormixing results, some of which are subtractive charts and some 
of which are additive charts. Do students choose to engage in critical 
thinking by deciding what charts to believe?
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students have set the lights for a contestant, the contestant 
sings. As the song progresses, the stage light shines the color 
that comes from the combination of lights the student picked. 
If the students mixed correctly, the singer receives stars for the 
song, and if they mixed poorly, the singer does poorly. There 
are three rounds, and in each one, the color mixing becomes 
more challenging. Figure 2.1 (plate 1) depicts the final round for 
contestant Otter. For the last part of his song Otter wanted 
orange, and the student has mixed correctly by choosing two 
red lights and one green light. Children play the game in ten to 
twenty minutes, and so far, they find it quite entertaining.
Most children have been taught that the primary colors are 
red, yellow, and blue. The primary colors for mixing light, how-
ever, are red, green, and blue. The RGB input of a television 
refers to these primary colors. Red and green make yellow, and 
hence red, green, and red make orange. A major part of the 
game involves learning about mixing light.
To help students learn, the digital environment includes a 
pair of resources. On the upper-right portion of the screen is an 
experiment room, where students can try out different color 
combinations without risking a wrong answer for a contestant. 
On the lower-right side, there is a faux shopping catalog. Differ-
ent companies sell charts for mixing colors. Some of the charts 
are for subtractive color, and some are for additive color. Figure 
2.1 (plate 1) shows the chart that sets out the correct additive 
color combinations and their results. Students have to use criti-
cal thinking to decide which charts to believe, if they choose to 
use the charts at all. To make our assessment, we track the stu-
dents’ choices in log files generated by the game.
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In an initial study using a similar environment with sixth-
grade children, the results were quite clear. Children who chose 
to look at the catalog of charts learned much more about mixing 
additive color than their counterparts did. More important, 
these same children were also doing better in school. In fact, the 
amount of time students committed to figuring out the catalog 
entries predicted about 35 percent of the variation in the stu-
dents’ grades in their mathematics classes (the only classes for 
which we had records). While all the students seemed happy to 
play the game, those who chose not to engage in critical think-
ing were also the students who were doing worse in mathemat-
ics. The 35 percent level of prediction is high, especially 
considering that Ohno! Has Talent has little to do with solving 
math problems as they appear on the children’s mathematics 
tests. The assessment captured something crucial about how 
these children go about learning that is affecting their success in 
mathematics—and will likely do so in the future.
This choicelet example, which is only promissory pending 
further research, offers two take-home messages. First, by assess-
ing students’ choices during learning, we can discover a great 
deal about the processes they do or do not use to learn. Ideally, 
with this choice-based information, we can help students to 
make better choices for learning. The second point is that we 
can assess choices that are critical to learning but that are missed 
by most tests. Tracking the process of learning is different from 
simply detecting whether a student knows an answer or not, 
which is the output of most tests. Choice-based assessments can 
provide a much richer corpus of information from which to 
draw actionable information about learners. We can locate the 
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source of the problem rather than just the consequence. The 
students who were doing the worst in math class, for instance, 
were those who used the experiment room to solve each prob-
lem through trial and error. These students, instead of trying to 
develop an overall understanding of additive color, were simply 
attempting to get the right answer for each problem in turn. In 
the best case, identifying this pattern of malchoices can help a 
teacher address the underlying learning issue, which is that the 
students are trying to solve each problem in turn rather than 
discovering the general principle that governs the solutions to 
all problems.
Summary
With more choices and interactivity comes more information 
about the learner. Performance assessments, such as portfolio 
and project-based assessments, have tried to capitalize on the 
increased information found in choice-rich environments (e.g., 
Resnick and Resnick 1994). Richard Shavelson, Gail Baxter, and 
Jerome Pine (1991), for example, describe a kit-based perfor-
mance assessment for science. Students conduct physical exper-
iments to determine which brand of paper towel absorbs more 
water. The assessment provides information about the students’ 
abilities (or inclinations) to use experimental logic and take 
careful measurements. Unfortunately, the authors also point 
out that performance assessments can be prohibitively expen-
sive to deploy and score at scale.
Technology can help overcome the difficulties associated 
with increased information. Computers can deliver assessments 
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where students make choices about how to learn, and the com-
puters can automatically log all user behaviors that might be of 
interest to a teacher, assessor, or researcher, ranging from chat 
logs to virtual interpersonal distance to direction of gaze. It is an 
ethnographer’s thick description for free. Computers provide 
new efficiencies that make tractable what was once impractica-
ble. And with new empirical capabilities, new theories are sure 
to follow, as we will now discuss.
II Theoretical Matters

3 Choice Is the Central Concern
For the many stakeholders in education, choice is the central 
concern. Parents care about their children’s choices, such as 
how they spend their free time, whether they try hard at school, 
and even whether they develop a sense of the possibilities from 
which they might choose. Parents hope for “good choices,” and 
arguably, many parents care about “good knowledge” (or 
grades) to the extent that it enables opportunities for choices 
later on. Yet despite the manifest importance of choice, current 
assessments primarily evaluate a degraded sense of choice, as in 
choosing an answer on a multiple-choice test, or choosing to 
opt out of a test or school altogether.
Educators also value choice. In most primary school class-
rooms, there are charts on the wall that specify the top class-
room priorities, and the top entry is usually “Make Good 
Choices.” Educators want schools to help students choose and 
learn once they leave school. Daniel Schwartz, John Bransford, 
and David Sears (2005) interviewed school superintendents to 
determine what help learning scientists might provide to their 
endeavor. One possibility was that the superintendents would 
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ask for assistance in achieving high test scores to increase their 
districts’ standings. They did not. Instead, “the surprisingly 
unanimous answer (they were surprised as well) was that they 
wanted us to help students make their own choices in the 
future. They wanted the students to be able to ‘learn for them-
selves’ and make informed decisions. They believed that well-
designed school experiences could transfer to help children 
continue to learn once they left school” (ibid., 2).
Subsequent discussions with school principals revealed a 
similar concern. The principals often explained that they recog-
nized the value of the yearly high-stakes tests and wanted their 
students to do well. But they also wanted assessments that could 
help them evaluate how they were achieving many of their 
local educational goals. These goals invariably map onto stu-
dent choices—for example, students’ love of learning, critical 
thinking, and willingness to collaborate well. Ideally, assess-
ments would provide information to superintendents and prin-
cipals about how their schools are doing in these respects, but 
measurement of such outcomes is beyond the reach of main-
stream assessment practices.
Educational researchers also care about choice. Erna Yackel 
and Paul Cobb (1996, 473) nicely summarize the perspective of 
many: “The development of intellectual and social autonomy is 
a major goal in the current educational reform movement, more 
generally, and in the reform movement in mathematics educa-
tion, in particular. In this regard, the reform is in agreement 
with Piaget that the main purpose of education is autonomy.” 
The central component of autonomy, of course, is the ability to 
make and execute choices.
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When one looks at the terms used in many debates (and edu-
cation has many debates), they appear to have choice at their 
core, even if the debate is framed in other terms (e.g., construc-
tivism versus direct instruction). Table 3.1 provides a sampling 
of opposite positions. The left side shows the terms adopted by 
reform-minded educators, and the right side displays the terms 
they use to label the alternatives. We assume that the preference 
for greater choice reflects a desire for students to develop 
agency. Choice is what creates the possibility of agency, and 
therefore many educational researchers prefer high-choice envi-
ronments for learning.
Unfortunately, when it comes to justifying the practical out-
comes of their theories and instruction, researchers often rely on 
gains in knowledge, because knowledge is the accepted frame for 
what it means to have learned. It would be more harmonious if 
these agency-driven theories used choice as the outcome of edu-
cation rather than only knowledge. A focus on knowledge can 
sometimes be incommensurate with choice. Sigmund Tobias 
Table 3.1
Contrasts in educational discourse often tacitly appeal to a notion of 
agency
High choice Low choice








(2009, 343), for example, concludes that “student choice may 
be a confounding variable” in research on student learning. In 
this view, choice is a nuisance variable to be controlled. By con-
trolling choice, it would be possible to infer the mechanical 
gears that drive knowledge acquisition. If people were only like 
blocks on inclined planes, researchers would not have to worry 
about choice when evaluating knowledge acquisition.
Informal educators also care about choice (e.g., Falk and Dier-
king 2002). Informal learning is frequently self-selected, and 
thus it has been taken as a setting of high relevance to outcomes 
of interest, identity, and participation. The 2009 National 
Research Council report, Learning Science in Informal Environ-
ments, added two strands to the original four strands of science 
learning established by the 2007 report, Taking Science to School. 
Specifically, it included “strands 1 and 6—which are of special 
value in informal learning environments” (Bell, Lewenstein, 
Shouse, and Feder, 2009). Strand 1 refers to interest, excitement, 
and motivation in science, and strand 6 relates to identification 
with science. These new strands emphasize the importance of 
students developing an attraction toward science so they will 
make choices to engage in it. Robert Tai, Christine Liu, Adam 
Maltese, and Xitao Fan (2006), for example, found that science 
career aspirations in eighth grade are a better predictor of later 
science engagement than class grades. To measure these new 
strands of outcomes, we need new types of assessments that go 
beyond the knowledge-driven curriculum tests so prevalent in 
formal learning settings. And simply asking students to check 
off their interests and motivations in a survey has insufficient 
precision for most purposes.
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Outside of instruction, the need to make learning choices is 
the norm. These choices are where the rubber of school meets 
the road of life. One especially vivid case involves preparation 
for the bar exam. Law school graduates need to pass a bar exam 
to become practicing lawyers, but law schools typically do not 
teach the specific knowledge needed for the exam. Law schools 
focus on broad issues and ways of thinking versus the specifics 
of particular state codes. To prepare for the exam, students rou-
tinely take special courses independent of law school. These 
preparation courses provide an overabundance of learning 
resources such as readings, reviews, outlines, practice tests, case 
synopses, videos, live lectures, workshops, and online tutorials. 
Figure 3.1 shows the thousands of pages of textual materials for 
one such course, the California BARBRI (http://www.barbri 
.com). Across materials, the content is highly redundant, so 
rather than plowing through everything, well-educated law stu-
dents choose the presentation format, activities, and timing of 
their study as well as the social arrangements that they feel suit 
their learning needs for different topics within the curriculum. 
Their learning is driven by their choices of what, when, how, 
and with whom to learn.
In this example, experiences within law school help students 
make sense of the content of the materials in order to make 
choices about how to navigate the mountain of resources to opti-
mize their progress toward the exam. Of course, not everyone has 
to prepare for a bar exam, but everyone faces situations outside of 
school for which school knowledge is not enough, such as com-
paring cars or camcorders. In these instances, the choices that 
people make about how to learn will determine their success.
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The modern workplace also puts choice at a premium. In 
prior generations, people could often anticipate a clear career 
trajectory and stable lifetime employment with one firm. In 
today’s economy, jobs are no longer stable, and skills need to be 
updated frequently. New information and affiliated technolo-
Figure 3.1
Some of the study materials for the BARBRI course that law students 
take to prepare for the California Bar Examination
The BARBRI course includes a massive collection of learning resources 
from books and practice tests to videotapes, lectures, and group ses-
sions. Ideally, law school prepares students to choose how and what to 
learn from the mountain of materials.
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gies appear daily, and workers must constantly adapt to new 
contexts, colleagues, jobs, and even careers to keep up with 
changes in competition as well as industry structure (Benner 
2002). In addition, workers are expected to participate in their 
own growth, as demonstrated by the widespread use of contin-
uous improvement programs across industries where the retool-
ing of skills is considered part of the job itself (Appelbaum and 
Batt 1994). At every level, the ability to accomplish difficult 
tasks in the present-day economy is more likely to depend on 
one’s ability to navigate the vast array of informational 
resources than one’s grasp of static knowledge that could be 
measured by today’s assessments. The question is no longer, 
“What do you know?” It is now, “What can you successfully 
choose to learn?”
Finally, choice is at the center of a free society that stresses 
democracy and opportunity. Democracy depends on people’s 
abilities to recognize and execute choices within the constraints 
that make society possible. Agency and participation are opera-
tionalized in choice. Questions of identity and inclusion matter 
because they contribute to the choices that people make.
Societies achieve their ideals of choice to varying degrees 
because of preexisting conditions, biases, and ill-formed social 
structures. Schools should not further contribute to a loss of 
choice; instead, they should directly address issues of choice in 
developmentally appropriate ways. For obvious reasons, chil-
dren should not have the same freedom of choice as adults. At 
the same time, choice is at the center of our social philosophy, 
and therefore should be at the center of assessments that are 
increasingly the beacon of what schools should accomplish.

4 The Isolation of Knowledge
Before continuing the positive case for choice-based assess-
ments, we will now consider the negative one against the cur-
rent state of affairs—namely, knowledge-based assessments. As 
a topic of inquiry and debate, the “concept” of knowledge has 
fueled great advances in scholarship, but it is not ideal for 
achieving the practical and normative aims of education. To 
mention just one shortcoming, knowledge assessments are 
inherently retrospective, but past knowledge is a small slice of 
what matters. Current knowledge assessments miss critical fac-
tors relevant to learning such as motivations to learn, responses 
to feedback and change, tacit understandings, and abilities to 
learn when no longer being told what to do.
Some readers might object that choice measurement is 
simply new packaging for knowledge assessment, because peo-
ple’s knowledge largely determines their choices. We agree that 
knowledge is one important determinant of choice, but this 
objection mistakes the purpose of assessment as being scientific 
rather than normative and practical. The scientific challenge 
would be to explain people’s choices, and people’s knowledge 
would surely be one causal component of such an explanation. 
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Education, however, is first and foremost a practical matter, and 
as such, its lead paradigm of measurement should be the one 
closest to the realm of action. At the end of the day, whether a 
student has “good knowledge” will be crucial only to the degree 
that knowledge leads to good choices, so why not measure 
choices directly in educational assessments? In the meantime, 
scientific efforts can continue to see if a rational, knowledge-
based account can provide a sufficient explanation of choice, 
which we highly doubt given the centrality of emotion in 
choice (see Damasio 1994).
There is instrumental value to using knowledge-based assess-
ments. Measuring what a student knows can help a great deal in 
deciding what to do next during instruction. The skills that 
come from knowledge are also essential for repetitive tasks; for 
example, it is important to ensure that people know how to 
drive a car before they get a license. Nevertheless, knowledge-
based assessments have such a stronghold on the public mind 
that they obscure the point of it all. We therefore will play the 
devil’s advocate and mount a one-sided argument to help 
dethrone knowledge (and the skills it enables) as the central 
assessed outcome of education. Knowledge is simply too narrow, 
and we believe that we can capture most knowledge-based con-
structs using choice-based assessments anyway.
We need to be honest here. We are cognitive scientists who 
attempt to formalize the nature of knowledge along with its 
implications for learning and problem solving (e.g., Schwartz 
and Black 1996). We use theories of knowledge acquisition to 
design our instruction, and we use theories of knowledge to help 
design measures for scientific experiments. We also believe that 
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good knowledge yields good outcomes. To paraphrase Socrates: 
knowing the Good yields doing the Good. Knowledge can also 
be its own reward independent of any utility. Appreciating a 
piece of art or recognizing the elegance of a mathematical proof 
does not require an instrumental justification. Even rote 
memory has its pleasures, as demonstrated by the surprising 
satisfaction of simply remembering a fact when watching a tele-
vision quiz show. These things do not need to be justified for 
their practical outcomes. We once had a conversation with a 
music professor who wished he was doing more important 
research on math and science learning. We pointed out that 
people spend much more time listening to music than doing 
algebra. We asked what could be more important than studying 
how to help people produce and appreciate it more. But as 
much as we love knowledge, and as much as we wish we had 
more of it, knowledge is a mismatch for the practical aims of 
assessment. Assessment is about shaping the direction of soci-
ety and its members.
As we build our leverage to pry assessment from the grasp of 
knowledge, it may be useful to recognize that knowledge has 
not always been the focus of assessment. Assessment in the 
United States has had many purposes, ranging from student 
tracking to individualized instruction to program evaluation to 
holding schools accountable (Haertel and Herman 2005). The 
purposes and methods of assessment can change, and we pro-
pose that now is a good time to change again, given the advent 
of new technologies and methods. Early on, assessment 
attempted to measure intelligence. Alfred Binet’s original goal 
in developing the first intelligence test was to help teachers 
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objectively identify children who needed special considerations. 
This approach failed as a model of assessment across education, 
in part because it confused purportedly unchangeable individ-
ual differences with contextual sources of group variability, 
including culture and socioeconomic status. Subsequent behav-
iorist approaches measured performance. These approaches 
emphasized the decomposition and mastery of observable skills, 
and were an advance in that they focused on what people 
learned rather than traits that predetermined learning. The 
behavioral assessments, however, were training oriented and 
too narrow to help evaluate whether students were being pre-
pared for life beyond the specific tasks. More recently, cognitive 
approaches have concentrated on assessing knowledge.
Knowledge assessments are an improvement over training 
and intelligence tests because they are more flexible. Knowledge 
assessments assume that adding more knowledge is possible, 
unlike intelligence tests. And unlike behaviorist assessments, 
knowledge-based ones can also examine sources of learner con-
fusion and do not require performance on a narrowly described 
set of trained tasks. Despite the relative value of knowledge-
based assessments, the construct of knowledge has limitations 
that have hampered further advances. For example, knowledge 
is often conceptualized as a sort of “mental text,” so instruc-
tional metaphors frequently suggest (incorrectly) that teaching 
is something like transmitting the text from the mind of the 
instructor into the mind of the learner, much like the monks 
transcribed letters from one volume to the next. With choice as 
the central construct, it becomes harder to develop simplistic 
and potentially ineffective metaphors like this one.
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There is also a deeper set of theoretical problems that make 
knowledge problematic in the context of assessment. They all 
stem from the isolation of knowledge: it is isolated from the 
bulk of social science research; as a description of a mental state, 
it is isolated from context; and perhaps worst of all, as an orga-
nization of information, it is isolated from the rest of the person. 
We detail these issues next. In the following chapter, we explain 
a less theoretical problem with knowledge assessments: they 
measure problem solving and not learning.
Isolation from Social Sciences
When considering human behavior, most social sciences focus 
on choice rather than knowledge. Economics, for instance, 
examines how financial matters drive choice and vice versa. 
Sociology looks at how patterns of association and structure 
influence choice. Management sciences explore “social selec-
tion”—how employees choose to configure their tasks and 
social relations. Political science and philosophy are intimately 
concerned with the balance of choice and necessity. In The 
Social Contract, Jean-Jacques Rousseau ([1762] 1947 bk. I, chap. 
6) puts freedom of choice as the fundamental issue: “The prob-
lem is to find a form of association .  .  . in which each, while 
uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and 
remain as free as before.”
This isolation of knowledge from other forms of scholarship 
comes at a loss to the field of assessment. For example, game 
theory, which examines choice behavior directly, could be a 
powerful source of ideas, but it has not been integrated into the 
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discussion of assessment. Moreover, a focus on individual 
knowledge makes it difficult to develop joint accounts of both 
individual outcomes and social configurations that support 
learning. The language of knowledge theories and that of social 
theories do not readily make contact. States provide reports of 
student performance broken out by school. The reports indicate 
how the students at the school are scoring on average. If your 
child’s school is doing poorly, you want to take action. Unfortu-
nately, the knowledge tests are based on what students have in 
their head. So you have discovered that your child’s school is 
not doing a great job, but there is nothing in the assessment 
that suggests what you might do on the social plane to help 
improve the state of affairs. This is because an assessment of 
knowledge is not an assessment of processes, and what you care 
about in classrooms is the process, not whether there is “knowl-
edge in the air.” We return to this point in chapter 9, on new 
types of process assessments.
In some cases, scholars do use knowledge, or the lack 
thereof, to help explain the choices that people make (e.g., 
Tversky and Kahneman 1974), but knowledge is only properly 
a means to an end. The goal in the social sciences is to account 
for human behavior, which is made manifest in choices. Treat-
ing knowledge as the primary outcome has left assessment as 
an isolated minority.
While it is beyond the scope of a book on assessment, it is not 
hard to envision how a theory of learning could be organized 
within choice. For instance, we can borrow from the search 
space formalism of Allen Newell and Herbert Simon (1972). The 
formalism creates something like a tree structure of possible 
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states, whether they have actually occurred or not (e.g., an X in 
the middle of a tic-tac-toe board, an X in the lower-right corner, 
an O in the upper-left corner, and an O in the upper-right corner, 
and so on). The links among the states indicate possible path-
ways that lead from one state to another (e.g., add an X btween 
the two Os). The formalism proposes that reasoning is the pro-
cess of searching through the paths in the tree structure to find 
the best path to achieve a final goal state (e.g., three Xs in a row). 
To convert this scheme to handle choices, there would be 
three primary components: the context of choices, the choices 
taken, and the choices that are subsequently enabled. The con-
text of choice is a specification of the field of learning choices 
that are available to a learner (i.e., possible states). Theories that 
focus on “positioning,” for instance, would specify how author-
ity relations determine the learning choices that are legitimated 
and available for a child or group of children (Harré and van 
Langenhove 1999). The second is a specification of the choices 
that learners actually make (i.e., traversal through the tree). Stu-
dents may have dispositions or identifications toward some 
choices over others (Gresalfi 2009). They may perceive restricted 
agency and miss choice possibilities. And they may simply not 
notice the availability of some choices or make choices that are 
suboptimal for their own goals. Finally, the third component is 
how a taken choice affects subsequent choice options (i.e., pos-
sible next states). Some choices open doors, and others close 
them. How one choice affects future possible choices is a critical 
component that has been undertheorized in learning. Given the 
choice space, one can then start to theorize what shapes the 
field of choices; what explains the decisions that students, 
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teachers, or any individual or group of learners make; and how 
specific configurations of choices open (or close) future oppor-
tunities for decision making about learning.
Isolation from Context
A second problem with knowledge, as typically formulated, is 
that it is isolated from context. Knowledge is a description of 
the mental contents of an individual. In one extreme formula-
tion, conceptual knowledge is said to improve by an increase in 
the abstractness of the mental representations. The logic is that 
more abstract knowledge can apply to a broader set of situa-
tions because it is not tied to any single situation. According to 
this line of thinking, abstractness develops by a process of sub-
traction, so that less and less of the original context of learning 
appears in the knowledge. Some scholars, in fact, have proposed 
that knowledge should be taught as abstractly as possible to 
shortcut the deleterious effects of context-specific representa-
tions (Kaminski, Sloutsky, and Heckler 2008).
James Gibson and Elizabeth Gibson (1955) highlighted the 
irony of the abstraction-as-subtraction perspective. They 
pointed out that by this account, learning leads one farther 
from the world rather than closer to it, which seems absurd 
given that experts are much more able to perceive contextual 
information than are novices (e.g., a sommelier can taste differ-
ences among red wines that a novice would miss; see also 
Beiderman and Shiffrar 1987).
At the core of many intuitive and formal knowledge accounts 
is the idea that knowledge is a highly structured, internal repre-
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sentation or copy of experience—a well-organized picture or 
text in the head, to put it coarsely. But there are alternatives to 
mental representation for describing competent performance. 
Plato, for example, proposed that understanding is like the sun: 
it illuminates the world rather than copying it. So as opposed to 
looking for people’s memories of specific facts, one needs to 
look at the processes by which people illuminate the facts as 
they arise. As a second analogy, take the case of a radio. The 
radio does not have a copy of the music it plays. Instead, it reso-
nates to the context of the radio signals. If a radio could learn, it 
would not do so by constructing knowledge of the content it 
plays. It would get better at tuning more channels, separating 
one signal from another—in other words, learning would equate 
with better sensitivities for picking up and responding to con-
textual information. In both of these cases, knowledge does not 
copy experience, and the idea of looking for people’s knowledge 
as a stand-alone representation does not make sense. As the lit-
erature on the transfer of learning from one setting to another 
has repeatedly demonstrated, learned behavior cannot be fully 
dissociated from the contexts of its acquisition or application 
(e.g., Barnett and Ceci 2002).
In knowledge-based assessments, context does not receive as 
much attention as it should. Most of education uses “supply-
side” assessments, which test students on what was supplied by 
the curriculum. Because supply-side assessments are confined to 
the curriculum context, they run the risk of producing a self-
tightening knot. If students do poorly on the assessment, 
instruction will increasingly start to look like the assessment 
itself—educators will teach to the test.
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An alternative is a “demand-side” assessment. Here, the 
assessment is tethered to the demands of a future context rather 
than the past curriculum. The Programme for International Stu-
dent Assessment (PISA) is a demand-side international assess-
ment that is being increasingly used by policymakers (http://
www.pisa.oecd.org). The items on the PISA reflect the demands 
of the work world. The PISA has a framework that specifies 
knowledge competencies (e.g., multistep problem solving) and 
domains of application (e.g., math), and there is a good deal of 
heated negotiation among nations and scholars about which 
facts and skills should be included in the PISA test. Despite its 
merits in considering the future context of knowledge applica-
tion, the PISA still suffers from a lack of attention to the context 
created by the assessment items themselves. Construction of the 
specific items on the test—the contextual vehicle of the assess-
ment—is often farmed out to “item makers” and taken as non-
problematic. Multiple-choice, true/false, or free-response items 
are all acceptable as long as they are efficient, reliable indicators 
of competency within the domain. If the PISA used choice as its 
main construct, then context could not be an afterthought in 
an assessment item, because choice does not exist indepen-
dently of the decision-making context.
We believe assessments should not be confined to knowledge 
but rather should include choice. At the same time, the choice 
constructs need to be tied to contexts. In the Ohno! Has Talent 
example in chapter 2, it would be inaccurate to say that we mea-
sured “critical thinking.” It is better to say we measured “critical 
thinking in a context of implicitly conflicting information 
sources.” The degree to which we will need to contextualize the 
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choice assessments when summarizing their results is an empiri-
cal question versus an assumption. It may ultimately have to be 
“critical thinking about implicitly conflicting information 
sources among chart products,” or worse, “critical thinking 
about implicitly conflicting information sources among chart 
products when solving puzzles about mixing light.” Hopefully, 
the choice-based contexts will not have to be so narrowly 
defined that there is an overproliferation of assessments. But 
acknowledging the significance of context is important in order 
to move beyond the mistaken assumption that what assess-
ments measure is context-free knowledge.
Isolation from the Rest of a Person
A third reason to relax the hold of knowledge on assessment is 
that knowledge is isolated from the rest of the individual. 
Across the history of Cognitive Science, a premier interdisciplin-
ary journal focusing on knowledge, it is hard to find more than 
a handful of articles on motivation, emotion, or identity. The 
fact that Cognitive Science partitions human performance by 
considering “cold knowledge” and excluding “hot affect” makes 
some sense. There is scientific value to analytically separating 
systems that nevertheless work together in nature. The study of 
knowledge as a separate assembly has led to great advances in 
psychology, philosophy, and computer science, to mention just 
a few areas of success. The primary goal of assessment, however, 
is the improvement of learning. To achieve this goal, it is 
important to include all sources of information about an indi-
vidual’s learning, not just cognitive markers of “cold” thinking.
Figure 4.1 (Plate 2)
Teachable Agent environment
(a) The student has named her agent “Dee,” customized Dee’s look, and 
taught her about consumers, producers, and decomposers. Dee has 
answered the question posed by the student, “Does a hawk eat food?” 
both graphically and in text, by chaining from hawk to carnivore to 
consumer to eat food. (b) Students can have their agents play an online 
game, where the students wager on whether their agent will give the 
right answer. The students can also chat online with one another. (c) 
The Lobby is the main entry portal into the environment. It includes 
the various assignments for the agent plus access to customizing fea-
tures, reading resources, the agent teaching interface, chatting, and the 
online game.
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Consider the case of low-achieving students. A knowledge 
assessment points out that they do not have strong knowledge. 
But ideally, an assessment would help predict what choices 
would lead to better learning, and what contexts would help 
promote those choices. Catherine Chase, Doris Chin, Marily 
Oppezzo, and Daniel Schwartz (2009) conducted a study that 
examined learner choices. Students worked with an intelligent 
software environment called a Teachable Agent (http://
workingexamples.org/frontend/project/18). Figure 4.1 (plate 2) 
shows the main teaching interface of the software. In this envi-
ronment, students make digital concept maps under the guise 
of creating the Teachable Agent’s brain. The digital maps are 
interactive and can use simple artificial intelligence techniques 
to answer questions by chaining through their links and nodes. 
The environment includes quizzes for the agents—a game show 
where the agents and their teachers (students) can chat, share 
reading resources, and play for hearts and fish.
In the teaching condition, the students were told that by cre-
ating a concept map, they were teaching a computer character 
(a Teachable Agent) to answer questions. The map was the 
agent’s brain, and the character in the lower-left corner repre-
sented the agent that the students were teaching. In the self 
condition, the students were told they were simply making a 
concept map to help themselves learn (there was no cover story 
of the map being an agent’s brain). They thought they were just 
using a “smart” program, and the character in the lower-left 
corner stood for themselves.
On a posttest of learning, the teaching condition outper-
formed the self condition. When separating students based on 
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their prior achievement, low-achieving students in the teaching 
condition performed as well as the high-achieving students in 
the self condition, and they did much better than the low-
achieving students in the self condition. It is hard to explain 
these differences by appealing to differences in the low-achiev-
ing students’ knowledge in the two conditions, either before-
hand or afterward. After all, they were low knowledge to start 
with. Instead, the key assessment involved examining students’ 
choices of whether and how to learn. The logs from their use of 
the software revealed what happened. The low-achieving teach-
ing students did well because they chose to spend more time 
working on their maps; they read the relevant resources more 
and edited their maps’ links and nodes in accordance. In con-
trast, the low-achieving students in the self condition spent 
more of their time chatting and playing the available game.
One might wonder what psychological states led to the 
choices. This is a good question that the researchers subsequently 
addressed (the Teachable Agent created an ego-protective buffer 
plus a sense of responsibility, so students did not feel bad about 
mistakes but instead were compelled to figure out how to fix 
them). As we mentioned previously, though, this is a scientific 
question indifferent to the assessment of learning choices.
How far can assessments go by focusing on choice, without 
positing knowledge to explain those choices? This is an open 
question. The purpose of this book is to catalyze exploration of 
this question such that the field of assessment can move beyond 
cold knowledge assessments that are so isolated they cannot 
evaluate student motivations in the context of learning.
5 Preparation for Future Learning
A second major problem with knowledge, in addition to its iso-
lation, is that a knowledge assessment is a description of a pur-
portedly stable mental state. Assessment designers try to ensure 
that they are detecting a stable state and not a temporary effect, 
for example, by doing test-retest reliability measures. Knowl-
edge is taken as an end or start state; it is not about learning per 
se. This concern with capturing knowledge states rather than 
dynamic change has had major implications for assessment. 
The first has been an emphasis on problem solving. The second 
has been a focus on mastery. While both are good, they do not 
directly emphasize learning, and they miss experiences that 
prepare people to learn. We detail these points next, while 
describing an alternative type of assessment that looks at learn-
ing itself.
Problem Solving without Learning
The cognitive revolution has stressed problem solving and, 
unfortunately, largely left the learning emphasis of behaviorism 
behind. (Whatever one might think of the restricted explana-
tions of behaviorism, its focus on the tight connection between 
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learning and motivation was a great strength.) A perusal of the 
finest cognitive psychology textbooks (e.g., Anderson 2000) 
reveals scores of constructs that explain the knowledge organi-
zations and processes that affect problem solving—schemata, 
priming, working memory, echoic buffers, attention shifting, 
and so on—but only a handful of constructs to explain learn-
ing, most of which emphasize memory encoding and retrieval 
(e.g., association and consolidation). Attempts to make knowl-
edge more dynamic by using the active verb knowing, or know-
ing in action, suffer the same problems: they are about problem 
solving and not learning.
Users of knowledge assessments can infer learning by giving 
the same assessment as a pretest and posttest. This is quite rare 
in educational practice; few teachers give pretests to measure 
subsequent learning gains, in part because it detracts from 
instructional time. Even if they did, wouldn’t it be more to the 
point to evaluate learning directly?
Bransford and Schwartz (1999) labeled most current assess-
ments as sequestered problem solving (SPS). In the typical SPS 
assessment, students are sequestered (like a jury) from learning 
opportunities and outside resources that might contaminate the 
validity of the assessment. Learning during a test would be 
cheating. Consider the following informal example of the short-
comings of SPS assessment.
A late-night talk show host asks a group of students who 
have just graduated from Harvard a handful of tricky questions 
like, “Is the earth closer to the sun in June or December?” or, 
“What is the best way to reintroduce a baby eagle to the wild?” 
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To the delight of the audience, the Harvard grads fare no better 
on these questions than a group of high schoolers. This assess-
ment purports to demonstrate that the experience of going to 
Harvard does not produce the learning gains one would expect. 
The television show Are You Smarter Than a 5th Grader? has capi-
talized on making otherwise-educated people look stupid. 
Adults often do not recall the facts that the show asks, and the 
fifth graders regularly do. Other examples include the frequent 
polls that indicate that Americans do not know basic facts that 
must have been covered in school or newspapers.
What these scenarios actually demonstrate is that SPS assess-
ments do not tell the whole story, though they do capture the 
public mind for what it means to have learned. Imagine, instead, 
what would happen if both groups of students were given access 
to learning resources during their quizzes. The Harvard students 
would probably use the learning opportunity to produce 
responses that outshone those of the high schoolers. Similarly, 
the adults would probably be better at finding the answers to the 
questions than the fifth graders (although one never knows how 
they choose the adults to be on such a program).
Here is a second, simple thought experiment. Imagine that a 
firm wants to hire a financial analyst. Tom has just completed a 
two-week course in Excel—his first exposure to spreadsheet soft-
ware. Sig has not learned Excel. Instead, using multiple spread-
sheet packages over the past several years, he taught himself, 
achieving high levels of expertise. The company decides whom 
to hire by using a paper-and-pencil test of basic Excel operations 
that just happen to have been covered in Tom’s course. Tom 
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would probably do better on this SPS test. We suspect, however, 
that Sig would be more likely to serve the company well in the 
long run. His deeper understanding of spreadsheet structure and 
capacity to learn independently will enable him to learn and 
adapt on the job—for example, when the company switches to 
a new software package or when the employees are asked to 
learn advanced features of Excel on their own. The failure of SPS 
tests is one reason that all employers would prefer to hire people 
for a trial period to see if the employee adapts to and learns in 
their local context. Edwin Ghiselli (1966) reported that aptitude 
tests only predict 9 percent of job performance immediately 
after training, and subsequently drop to 5 percent after time on 
the job. This is because people learn on the job, and sequestered 
assessments like aptitude tests are not designed to predict peo-
ple’s future learning.
An alternative to a static SPS assessment is a dynamic assess-
ment. Reuven Feuerstein (1979) introduced dynamic assess-
ments as an alternative to the standard administration of IQ 
tests. During the test, he would assist children, and therefore 
would see if they could learn from his help to solve the IQ prob-
lems. By using a dynamic assessment, he was able to make more 
useful diagnoses about children’s learning potential.
Bransford and Schwartz (1999), who were concerned that 
theories of transfer were only focusing on the application of 
knowledge rather than learning, proposed a dynamic assess-
ment format they termed preparation for future learning (PFL). In 
a PFL assessment, there are resources for learning during the 
test, and the question is whether students learn from them. 
Bransford and Schwartz reasoned that PFL assessments would be 
Preparation for Future Learning 53
sensitive to differences in instruction that would be missed by 
static SPS tests. As support, Schwartz and Taylor Martin (2004) 
contrasted SPS with PFL assessments in the context of teaching 
statistics to ninth-grade students. In this experiment, one factor 
was how students were taught. Half the students received direct 
instruction, and the other half completed a form of guided dis-
covery called “inventing” (cf. Schwartz, Chase, Oppezzo, and 
Chin 2011). A week later the students completed a long test. At 
the end of the test, there was a problem beyond the edge of 
what they had been taught.
The experiment crossed the instructional factor with a second 
one that involved the test itself. For half the children in each 
instructional condition, the tests simply included the difficult 
target problem without any resources for learning during the 
test. Thus, the students who used this form of the test completed 
an SPS assessment. The other half the students in each instruc-
tional condition completed a PFL version of the test. In the 
middle of the test, there was a worked example that students had 
to follow to solve an accompanying problem. The worked exam-
ple showed how to solve a new kind of statistics problem, and 
students had to follow the worked example to solve a similar 
problem on the exact same page. All the students did well at 
copying the worked example to solve the associated problem. 
The main question, though, was whether the students would 
learn from the worked example. Unbeknownst to the students, 
the information in the worked example part of the test held the 
key to solving the hard problem at the end of the test.
Figure 5.1 shows the main results for how well students per-
formed on the difficult problem at the end of the test. First, 
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Improving the assessment of instruction by evaluating students’ abili-
ties to learn during a test
The students represented by the arrows in the middle of the graph 
received a learning resource as part of their test. This “learning during 
the test” assessment made it possible to differentiate the value of the 
two forms of instruction shown in the upper boxes. The students who 
did not receive the learning resource (the outer arrows) performed the 
same, which would have erroneously led to the conclusion that the two 
instructional treatments had the same value. (Adapted from Schwartz 
and Martin 2004.)
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notice the levels of performance on the far right and far left of 
the graph. These are the levels of performance of the students 
who received the SPS version of the test, which did not include 
the worked example resource. By this SPS assessment, both 
forms of instruction led to the same outcomes, and one might 
naturally conclude that there is no advantage for one type of 
instruction over the other. Next, look at the two center bars 
indicating how well students did on the PFL version of the 
assessment. These are the students who received the worked 
example in the middle of their test. In this case, the invent 
instruction students doubled the performance of the direct 
instruction students. The invent instruction had better prepared 
students to learn during the assessment and then spontaneously 
use this learning. The simple point of this extended research 
example is that the use of dynamic assessments that include 
opportunities for learning can tell us a good deal more about 
the effects of instruction than can tests that simply measure 
static knowledge.
Mastery without Change
Knowledge provides a poor account of change. Either one has it 
or one does not, and knowledge-based accounts have trouble 
explaining how knowledge bootstraps itself from one state to 
another. This was highlighted in the learning paradox offered 
by Plato (Meno, 80.d):
But how will you look for something when you don’t in the least know 
what it is? How on earth are you going to set up something you don’t 
know as the object of your search? To put it another way, even if you 
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come right up against it, how will you know that what you have found 
is the thing you didn’t know?
Knowledge-based theories cannot easily give an account of 
where fundamentally new knowledge comes from. This is one 
reason that people argue that certain human abilities are innate; 
they cannot explain how the abilities could have been learned 
(Chomsky 1966; Pinker 1994). It is also one reason why it has 
been so difficult to produce a satisfactory knowledge-based 
account of conceptual change. Where can new concepts come 
from, if they do not come from ideas one already has? But if 
they come from prior concepts, then they must not be new con-
cepts. Such is the knot of knowledge-based accounts.
In assessment, the description of knowledge as a state has led 
to an emphasis on mastery. Tests emphasize the mastery of 
skills and knowledge: Do students have the state of knowledge 
or not? If they exhibit mastery, they have knowledge. If they do 
not exhibit mastery, they do not have knowledge.
How does a mastery emphasis interact with the goal of seeing 
whether students are prepared for future learning? One assump-
tion appears to be that if we want to assess someone’s prepara-
tion for future learning, we should see if they have mastered the 
past. This seems like the rationale behind the Scholastic Assess-
ment Test (SAT). The test tries to predict college success by 
seeing if students have mastered the mathematics, reading, and 
writing from earlier lessons.
The idea of looking at prior mastery to predict future learn-
ing is reasonable, but there is a catch. Tests of mastery presup-
pose knowledge in a mature form, implying that anything short 
of mastery does not count as knowledge and cannot be assessed. 
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Yet this is not true. First, people have earlier forms of under-
standing that do not comprise full-blown, declarative or proce-
dural knowledge but that are nevertheless crucial for future 
learning. Michael Polyani (1966) referred to this as tacit knowl-
edge. Harry Broudy (1977) described it as knowing with, as distin-
guished from knowing that and knowing how. Second, it is 
possible to assess these earlier forms of understanding, if we 
create assessments that allow learning during the test.
The late Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky ([1934] 1987, 
200) neatly captured the peril of mastery assessments:
Like a gardener who in appraising species for yield would proceed incor-
rectly if he considered only the ripe fruit in the orchard and did not 
know how to evaluate the condition of the trees that had not yet pro-
duced mature fruit, the psychologist who is limited to ascertaining what 
has matured, leaving what is maturing aside, will never be able to obtain 
any kind of true and complete representation of the internal state of the 
whole development. 
Knowledge-based assessments that can only detect mature forms 
of knowledge miss many of the important precursors of learn-
ing. One of PFL assessments’ key benefits is that they can detect 
immature forms of understanding that SPS assessments miss. 
This makes them well suited to studying the types of informal 
learning that are so prevalent in today’s information-rich eco-
system, because these types of learning often yield significant 
experiences that cannot be detected by mastery-focused tests.
For example, PFL assessments can be useful for evaluating 
digital game-based learning. James Paul Gee delivered a keynote 
to game researchers at the 2010 International Conference on 
the Foundations of Digital Games in which he mentioned that 
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games could and should be used as preparation for future learn-
ing. It is easy to imagine how digital games might serve in this 
role. The rich experiences offered by gameplay are likely to pro-
duce tacit knowledge that is not easily measured by SPS tests of 
knowledge but that might be detected by PFL assessments. Play-
ers of the popular video game Portal, for instance, have ample 
opportunity to experiment with conservation of momentum, 
yet lacking some formal explanation of the phenomenon, the 
players would probably not do well on a physics test given in an 
SPS format. A PFL physics test, however, could provide a link 
between the players’ experiences in the game and the formal 
physics concepts, thereby revealing the advantages for those 
who played Portal compared to a control group that did not 
play the game before taking the test.
To test the idea that the experience provided by digital games 
could serve as preparation for future learning, we built a game 
designed to help students learn the basic concepts of probability 
distributions (Arena and Schwartz 2010). Statistics is a notori-
ously difficult topic for people to learn and reason about (Nis-
bett, Krantz, Jepson, and Kunda 1983). One reason is that people 
naturally reason about single outcomes rather than distribu-
tions of outcomes. For instance, they often believe that the goal 
of statistics is to predict a single outcome versus a pattern of 
outcomes (Konold 1989). Making a “point prediction” reflects a 
causal form of reasoning as opposed to a statistical one. To the 
novice, random often connotes “without pattern,” so the idea 
of statistics, where randomness supports inferences, can be dif-
ficult to grasp. We believed that one way to address this prob-
lem was to provide students with experiences that would give 
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them intuitions about patterns of randomness (i.e., distribu-
tions) and probability before they received explicit instruction. 
Thus, our goal was not to produce a game that would teach stu-
dents everything they needed to know about probability distri-
butions (a bleak prospect for a game). We instead wanted to 
produce a game that would give students experience interacting 
with and thinking about probability distributions informally, so 
that when they received a subsequent exposition about proba-
bility, their gameplay experiences would help them understand 
the formal concepts. To that end, our game makes no explicit 
references to probability terms or concepts.
Figure 5.2 (plate 3) shows that in the game Stats Invaders, 
players simply shoot aliens dropping from the sky while trying 
to determine which of two displayed patterns (actually proba-
bility distribution curves) best describes the pattern in which 
the aliens are dropping. Once students have made their deter-
mination, they pick one of the two distributions on the right. 
This launches a bomb that is tuned to explode a mother ship in 
the same distribution (the game is a bit “male”). If the player 
picks the right bomb, the mother ship hidden above the 
descending aliens is destroyed. If not, the player loses a life—
one of the standard tricks of video games.
In a study of the effectiveness of the game, we adapted the 
same research logic from before, where we compared SPS versus 
PFL measures of learning. As a pretest, a group of community 
college students completed a brief questionnaire about random-
ness and probability distributions with questions like, “What is 
the purpose of finding the pattern for a type of random event?” 
and, “What is the defining characteristic of a uniform distribu-
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Figure 5.2 (Plate 3)
Stats Invaders: A video game to support the development of statistical 
intuition
Players shoot at descending aliens in the style of old arcade games. The 
aliens fall according to a horizontal statistical distribution (e.g., they 
are more likely to descend in some locations than in others). To end a 
round, players have to set a bomb tuned to the frequency of the 
“mother ship” by picking which of the shapes on the right side best 
describes the shape of the ship dropping the aliens. The goal is to help 
students develop intuitions about patterns within chance.
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tion?” Then we had half the students play our game and half 
not. Next, half the students in each condition received a short 
reading passage on patterns in randomness. Finally, we gave all 
the students another test just like the first one. There were two 
key questions. Would playing the game improve performance 
on the test in its own right? And more important, would stu-
dents who had played the game learn more from the passage 
than those who had not played the game?
Figure 5.3 shows gains from the first test to the second. Stu-
dents from both groups learned from the passage, but students 
in the gameplay condition learned much more than students in 
the no-gameplay condition. The game players were able to relate 
what they were reading to their recent experiences in the game. 
Playing the game developed the earlier forms of knowledge that 
prepared the students to learn when given a chance. The game 
had created a time for telling (Schwartz and Bransford 1998). 
Notably, if we had not given the students a chance to learn, this 
benefit of the game would have gone undetected. Assessments 
that involve learning as part of the test can diagnose the bene-
fits of intuitively compelling experiences that are missed by 
static knowledge tests. In chapter 7, we provide an example of a 
different type of PFL assessment that we used to evaluate 
whether popular commercial video games prepare students for 
future learning.
In the two cases of PFL assessments for statistics learning, the 
PFL assessment ultimately depended on a knowledge posttest. 
Students received posttests that examined whether they could 
answer questions based on the knowledge that had been told to 



















approach to assessment using current standards and terms. One 
can only imagine trying to convince a policymaker about the 
value of new forms of assessments, if those assessments com-
pletely abandoned familiar terms. It would be like arguing that 
the gross domestic product (GDP) should be replaced by gross 
domestic happiness (GDH). Measuring happiness is not going to 
get very far in policy debates, despite the fact that it is closer to 
the goals of the citizens. To convince people that the GDH is a 
useful index, one would show that it supplies useful data that 
Figure 5.3
Benefits of gameplay in preparing students for future learning
Students who played a specially designed game to develop statistical 
intuitions learned more from an exposition on randomness than stu-
dents who had not played the game.
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capture the value of the GDP measure, but that it also provides 
even more value. Therefore, our strategy is to first show that 
new forms of assessment offer added value, for example, by cap-
turing what people think they care about in current terms 
(knowledge gains), while also capturing new information.
Our next task is to show that it is possible to use a choice-
based approach to a PFL assessment. For example, Ryan Baker, 
Sujith Gowda, and Albert Corbett (2011) found that student 
choices of how to use help in an intelligent tutoring system pre-
dicted students’ subsequent learning. The next chapter provides 
further relevant cases. After that, the final task is to show that 
choice-based assessments predict (and can change) future 
choices, thereby completely removing knowledge tests from the 
loop. We have not yet completed this final step (nor have we 
finished with the others). As neatly stated by José Ortega y 
Gasset (1960, 200), “Reason is not a train leaving at a fixed 
hour.” We do not think people are ready to fully abandon 
knowledge until many people, including ourselves, help set 




6 Choice-Based Assessments of Learning
Thus far, we have made the argument that new technologies 
support new forms of interactive instruction and assessment 
that align with the normative mission of education. We have 
also contended that assessments organized around knowledge 
are too far removed from the realm of action and the future 
learner adaptations that education cares about, and that knowl-
edge has inherent theoretical limitations for assessment. Our 
goal has been to convince people that there may be some value 
in considering a new interpretative framework for understand-
ing learning and designing assessments. 
Now, we turn to more practical matters. We show what hap-
pens when choice-based assessments are used in a PFL paradigm. 
Analyzing students’ choices while they are learning provides 
information that goes beyond knowledge-based assessments. 
We begin with a simple experiment that directly compares 
choice- and knowledge-based assessments for their predictive 
value. The example uses a simple puzzle to make the demon-
stration. From there, we move to more substantive instances 
that reveal the effects of graduate school, the impacts of persis-
tence in learning biology, and the development of basic math-
ematics in primary school children.
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Head-to-head Comparison of Choice and Knowledge Assessments
Anna Rafferty (2007) directly compared choice- and knowledge-
based assessments. The participants in her study worked with 
the interactive table shown in Figure 6.1. It is like a multipli-
cation table except that the diamond represents a mystery 
operator that uses letters instead of digits.1 To determine the 
function of the mystery operator, the participants guessed what 
belonged in each cell. They knew there was a lawful relation, 
and their task was to discover what it was. When the partici-
pants clicked on a cell to guess its entry, their click generated 
choice data (i.e., which cell they chose). They then used a 
pull-down menu to guess what letter belonged in the cell. This 
provided the data on their knowledge, with correct selections 
indicating higher knowledge. After completing this task, the 
participants received a transfer task, in which they had to learn 
and complete a new table that was governed by a different rela-
tion. The main research question of the study was which aspect 
of performance—knowledge or choice—on the first task better 
predicted successful learning on the second task.
To analyze the choice data, machine learning algorithms 
looked for instances in which the participants seemed to be 
trying to track down patterns. For example, if the participants 
clicked on several consecutive cells in the P column, these 
choices suggested that they were systematically uncovering 
the identity relation (P value in all cells of the column). On the 
other hand, if the participants clicked haphazardly from cell to 
cell, then their choices indicated that they were not on a pro-
ductive path. The analysis of the knowledge data was simply 
how many correct answers the participants produced.
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Figure 6.1
Task used to compare choice and knowledge assessments
Students tried to predict which letter showed up in each square. Their 
choices of which squares to test were more predictive of future learning 
than was the accuracy of the answers they gave for each square.
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Both knowledge and choice separately predicted learning 
on the second task, but choice was a significantly better predic-
tor. Moreover, in a second condition, the participants were not 
allowed to make choices about which cells to click. Instead, the 
system determined which cells they had to try. The participants 
in this case did worse on the transfer task. Thus, choice was 
better both as an assessment of how well the participants would 
learn in the future and it was better as a support for learning.
A more substantive demonstration of the value of a choice-
based assessment comes from a study that compared gradu-
ate and undergraduate students. Knowledge-based assessments 
often tally up how well students solve a series of separate prob-
lems on a test. For instance, on an algebra test, one might find 
the percentage of correct answers across twenty problems. 
Given that the problems are presented as separate items, many 
students try to answer each problem separately. The same is true 
for many problems in textbooks, where each problem is usually 
viewed in isolation. But answering each question in isolation is 
not an optimal way to learn. A better way is to develop a gen-
eral explanation or solution that can handle any relevant ques-
tion (Schwartz, Chase, Oppezzo, and Chin, 2011). Lee Martin 
and Schwartz (2009) designed a choice-based assessment to see 
if they could detect the effects of graduate school on students’ 
search for the general explanation.
Undergraduate and graduate students completed a diagnosis 
task that involved six fictitious diseases that each had multiple 
symptoms. Different diseases could share subsets of symptoms, 
which made it a hard diagnosis task. The students received 
twelve reference cases (patient files), each on a separate sheet 
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of paper, to help them. Each sheet indicated the symptoms and 
diagnosis for one patient. The students had to use the reference 
cases to help diagnose ten new patients. The new patients were 
presented on a computer. For each new patient, the students 
ordered medical tests to reveal symptoms, and when ready, 
made their diagnosis. They received feedback on their diagnosis 
and moved on to the next patient.
The undergraduate students were drawn from the general 
Stanford University population, of which over half were pursu-
ing a science- or engineering-related field. The graduate students 
were drawn from disciplines that involved complex information 
management (e.g., computer science, engineering, and biology), 
but none of them had completed diagnoses like these or had 
medical training.
Both the undergraduate and graduate students diagnosed the 
ten new patients with roughly 90 percent accuracy. The strik-
ing difference was that the undergraduate students were nearly 
done diagnosing the ten patients at about the same time that 
the graduate students began with their first patient. Evidently, 
graduate school teaches students to be slow.
What happened? All the graduate students spent a substan-
tial portion of time working with the reference cases (patient 
files) before turning to diagnose the new patients. They made 
various representations such as matrices and decision trees. 
These representations created a compact depiction of the rela-
tions between symptoms and diseases, which became a “smart 
tool” or general solution for handling any possible case. Only 
after completing this representation did the graduate students 
begin diagnosing the new patients on the computer, and once 
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they started their diagnoses, they never looked back to the orig-
inal reference cases. In contrast, only 18 percent of the under-
graduates bothered to make a general solution. They instead 
dove straight into the new patients. With each new patient, 
after they revealed a symptom, the undergraduates would shuf-
fle through the reference cases to see what the symptom might 
mean.
Even though the undergraduate and graduate students were 
equally accurate, there was a hidden advantage for the graduate 
students. To evaluate each of the ten patients, it was necessary 
to order tests to find the absence or presence of specific symp-
toms. The graduate students were more “cost-effective” because 
they were able to diagnose each patient with fewer tests.
One probable explanation for these results is that gradu-
ate school provided many experiences handling data. Gradu-
ate school in empirical domains involves a good deal of trying 
to figure out one’s own research data. When trying to explain 
data, one does not try to solve a single problem. Rather, one 
attempts to find a parsimonious explanation for all the patterns 
in the data. Perhaps these experiences led the graduate students 
to work toward a single general representation before testing it 
out on the ten new patients. In contrast, the undergraduates 
had learning experiences that emphasized the rhetorical task of 
getting the right answer using what they had been told in class. 
They focused on solving each problem in turn.
While these explanations are speculative, one explanation 
that does not work has to do with knowledge of the task, or 
knowledge of how to create a representation of the data. Other 
conditions in the experiment indicated that when pushed 
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to make an organizing visual representation of the data, the 
undergraduate students were able to do so. Thus, the critical 
factor was whether the students chose to create a visual and 
general solution.
From our read of the literature, this is a rare demonstration of 
the effects of sustained inquiry, specifically graduate school, on 
how people subsequently go about learning something new (for 
another example, see Wineburg 1991 also discussed below).2 It 
took an analysis of choices to find the effect. More generally, 
it is interesting to note that most assessments that attempt to 
measure the general effects of a college education often miss the 
point of a liberal arts education. They measure facts, skills, and 
problem solving (e.g., http://www.collegiatelearningassessment 
.org). But the point of liberal arts is to prepare students to con-
tinue learning throughout life by making wise learning choices.
Where Knowledge Cannot Tread
Knowledge-based assessments, because they focus on cold cog-
nition, do not provide a good index into motivation. Choice-
based assessments offer a way to generate behavioral data on 
motivational profiles. This is useful because it examines motiva-
tion in response to specific contextual conditions.
Catherine Chase (2011) recently tested a choicelet to mea-
sure an element of intelligent persistence. This choicelet was in 
the form of a game. It included five separate “planets,” each 
targeting a different subtopic of genetic inheritance. On each 
planet, there was a brief challenge on the relevant subtopic. 
The challenges depended on topics in genetic inheritance that 
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students had yet to learn, so it was a PFL assessment. Students 
had to learn while playing the planet game. To help them, stu-
dents had access to resources for learning (e.g., readings and 
corrective feedback), and they received points for winning chal-
lenges. At any time, students could move to and from the plan-
ets as well as any of the learning resources, with their choices 
logged for later analysis. After finishing the game, students took 
a paper-and-pencil posttest on inheritance.
The key analysis involved what students chose to do after 
they lost a planet challenge: Did they stick with the planet and 
challenge, or did they leave the planet to play a different one? 
Also, did students’ choices to persist or not provide any useful 
information? The rate at which students chose to leave a game 
room after failure was extremely diagnostic. As a simple cor-
relation, leaving after failure explained 50 percent of the vari-
ance in how well students learned genetics from the game (as 
measured by the posttest). It also explained 33 percent of the 
variance in students’ science classroom achievement (which in 
this case was eighth-grade physics, not biology). The measure 
of leaving after failure was more predictive of performance in 
the game and science class than were the frequency of game 
failure, pretest scores, standardized measures, and motivational 
surveys. Choice behavior can provide information missed by 
standard tests of knowledge, and choice behavior is more effec-
tive at predicting learning than are motivational surveys (a typi-
cal approach to noncognitive assessments).
As a final example, we return to the problem of assessing 
learning that precedes full-blown knowledge. We provided 
the example earlier of Stats Invaders, where students developed 
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intuitions about statistics that we could detect with a separate 
PFL assessment. Here, we integrate the assessment into the 
learning environment. We show that analyzing choices can pro-
vide access to critical aspects of learning that precede full-blown 
knowledge, yet are regularly missed by mastery-oriented tests.
Most assessments focus on student knowledge by asking 
what schema, concept, or skill set must they have in mind. But 
if students have not mastered the relevant knowledge, it is dif-
ficult to make much headway beyond saying they do not have 
the knowledge. In the language of assessment, an item that stu-
dents do not have the knowledge to answer yields little useful 
information about their ability levels. Examining choices offers 
more information.
Kristen Blair (2009) examined children’s learning in a sim-
ulation environment intended to teach mathematical group-
ing. Figure 6.2 shows that students entered numerical values 
in the upper-right corner. A character named SpiderKid used 
these values to shoot webs different distances to rescue a cat. 
The figure depicts an advanced level in the game where stu-
dents had to enter both the distance of each web (place value) 
and how many of them were needed (face value). The game 
reflected the recursive structure of numerical bases (e.g., the 
familiar base-ten, place-value system). The game was designed 
to create implication feedback (Blair 2009). Students could see 
the implications of their quantitative specifications because 
SpiderKid would go too far, not far enough, or to the right spot 
based on what the students had entered. This is different from 
simply saying that students are right or wrong, or just showing 
them the correct answer.
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Many children were not very good at the task early on. By 
analyzing the students’ choices in response to feedback, Blair 
discovered that the children were failing because they did not 
perceive the feedback provided by the environment. They did 
not see the precise differences between the Spiderkid’s climbing 
pattern on the left and the pattern of the building on the right. 
The problem was not what students were doing with the infor-
Figure 6.2
Screenshot of SpiderKid game
As part of a game to teach place value, children had to learn how to 
make the right-side ladder look like the left-side ladder so they could 
rescue a cat. The children entered values for the length of different col-
ored webs and also how many of each web length to use (i.e., they 
entered place and face values).
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mation in their heads; it was that the information never got in 
there in the first place. By looking at their choices, Blair identi-
fied a stable learning progression in the children’s abilities to 
perceive increasing amounts of structure in the feedback: right/
wrong information; too high or too low information; way too 
high/low or slightly too high/low information; and finally, the 
precise distance and direction of the discrepancy. Students who 
moved through the complete progression learned the matching 
recursive structure, whereas students who stalled at earlier levels 
never did. 
In this example, analyzing learner choices supported assess-
ments of what students could perceive and how this evolved, 
which is different from assessing what the students knew. If Blair 
had only assessed what students knew, the answer would have 
been “nothing” until the students finally solved the problems.
In this chapter, we provided four examples of choice-based 
assessments. In each case, the choices made by the participants 
supplied better insight into their learning than assessments of 
their knowledge. One goal of this chapter was to offer the exis-
tence proof that choice-based assessments can provide strong 
added value to the assessment enterprise. Of course, there are 
going to be instances where a poorly designed choice-based 
assessment does worse than a well-designed knowledge-based 
one. We do not want to make the claim that choice-based assess-
ments are always better, though we do assert that choice-based 
assessments can measure a broader range of learning outcomes.
A second goal was to provide some sense of the range of phe-
nomena that are within the measurement space of choice-based 
assessments that occur during learning. These include measures 
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of strategy (tracking down mathematical patterns), measures 
of metacognition (seeking the general explanation), measures of 
persistence (trying to learn after failure), and measures of abili-
ties to perceive (noticing the structure in feedback). This is quite 
different from just measuring right or wrong, and suggests the 
breadth of new kinds of things we might want to measure.
For instance, imagine that one wanted to measure the value 
of visiting a science museum. This is an elusive problem. First, 
it is difficult to get museum visitors to take a test. It seems pos-
sible, however, to give visitors an address to a Web site with 
follow-up games they could play and that are also choice-based 
assessments. This is likely to have more appeal than asking 
visitors to take a test. Second, and perhaps more difficult, any 
visit to a given museum exhibit is a short-lived experience for a 
visitor, so the effects would be subtle. The following is a thought 
experiment about how these subtle effects might be captured by 
an online, choice-based assessment.
One possible consequence of a museum experience is that it 
makes the content of the exhibits “sticky.” The museum experi-
ence might create a small interest that helps future related infor-
mation stick to that interest. The New York Hall of Science, for 
example, has an amazing exhibit on cosmic rays. It is a real-
time physical exhibit that shows the presence of cosmic rays. A 
pool of cooled ethanol reveals the cosmic rays, because the rays 
create contrails in the liquid as they fly through (sort of like a 
bubble chamber in an atom smasher). If people put their hands 
over the pool, it does not block the cosmic rays—they pass right 
through the hands and leave undisturbed traces in the liquid. 
This seems like a sticky experience that could attune people to 
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pick up more information about cosmic rays after they leave the 
museum.
To find out with a choice-based assessment, the visitors 
could receive a URL to play a game that has a lot of computer 
characters talking simultaneously, much like a party. At a select 
time, one of the characters among all the other voices could say 
a sentence that included the words “cosmic rays.” Would the 
brains of the people who had gone to the exhibit “choose” to 
hear the sentence more than people who had not gone to the 
exhibit? (The analog is when people somehow hear their name 
at a party, even though all the other words in the crowd were 
just an unattended sound track until their name was spoken.) 
If people did hear the character say “cosmic rays,” would they 
then choose to engage this character in the game? We certainly 
do not know the answer. What is more important is that we 
have a way to start finding out by using choice-based assess-
ments of people’s preparation for learning. There are many 
things we can measure given the ability to create and log new 
interactive contexts for learning.

7 Standards for Twenty-First-Century Learning Choices
In education, the decision about what to assess is largely 
driven by content standards. Standards create the possibility 
of accountability. The standards adopted by an educational 
system influence the textbooks written for that system, the 
daily instruction, and the assessments. Because of their impor-
tance, standards are often developed by high-powered commit-
tees. This can involve a good deal of negotiation about what is 
valuable for an educated citizen.
A concern with many standards is that negotiations yield 
laundry lists. An analogy comes from college English depart-
ments (and others, of course). All faculty members believe that 
their particular area of expertise should be considered manda-
tory for the students, whether or not it fits with everything else 
being offered. This produces something that is less coherent 
than one might want. It leads to the risk of a mile-wide, inch-
deep curriculum.
Designers of assessments have to chase standards, coherent 
or not. If standards do not have a set of overarching principles, 
the designers of assessments also do not have a set of principles 
for translating the standards into assessments. This can lead to 
unhappy results. Consider the following 2011 California Stan-
dards Test for eleventh-grade U.S. history:
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US11.1.2. Analyze the ideological origins of the American Revolution; 
the divinely-bestowed unalienable natural rights philosophy of the 
Founding Fathers and the debates surrounding the drafting and ratifica-
tion of the Constitution; the addition of the Bill of Rights.
Now consider figure 7.1, which shows the assessment item 
designed to measure whether a student has achieved the standard.
While the example is extreme, it is not uncommon. A per-
fectly good content standard calling for the analysis of ideologi-
cal debates has been dehydrated into a simplistic multiple-choice 
question about the name of the resolution. Busy teachers, rec-
ognizing that their students will be held accountable to the test, 
would be quite rational to skip the intent of the standard and 
teach the simple fact. Assessment designers (and teachers) need 
standards that provide overarching principles so they can decide 
whether a candidate assessment item fits the spirit of the stan-
dards. In the next paragraphs, we suggest two different types of 
frameworks. The first provides a high-level framework that may 
help prevent assessment choices that distort standards. It is also 
meant to clarify when it is important to assess choices instead of 
knowledge and skills. The second bridges between this high-level 
framework and the low level of actual assessment items by pro-
viding the ABCs of learning-oriented standards, where learning 
choices become part of the standards themselves.
A Framework for Highlighting When Choice-Based Assessments 
Are Most Relevant
A broader frame that stands above the standards can help 
facilitate local decisions about what should be taught and how 




Which of the following belongs 









One house based on population
One house based on
equal representation
Figure 7.1
A mismatch between standards and assessments
The assessment item is poorly designed to test the attainment of Cali-
fornia Standard US11.1.2: “Analyze the ideological origins of the Amer-
ican Revolution; the divinely-bestowed unalienable natural rights 
philosophy of the Founding Fathers and the debates surrounding the 
drafting and ratification of the Constitution; the addition of the Bill of 
Rights.”
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it should be assessed (e.g., National Research Council 2012). 
One approach is to develop a model of what it means to be an 
educated person. Rather than a laundry list of competencies, 
the target of instruction and assessment would be more holis-
tic. There is a common joke about developmental psychology 
textbooks: each chapter decomposes an aspect of child devel-
opment to the point where there are no actual children in the 
textbook. It is an analog of the blind people each feeling a 
different part of an elephant and never being able to grasp the 
whole of the beast. A frame for standards could present a holis-
tic model that helps keep in mind the recipients of education 
when designing for the many discrete competencies.
One solution embraced by cognitive science is to describe 
expertise (e.g., Ericsson 2009). A good model of expertise can 
assist people in backward engineering what the standards 
should include to achieve that expertise. For example, a por-
trayal of a chess master can help guide decisions about instruc-
tion and assessment for people trying to become chess masters. 
Using a model of expertise as a guiding framework can help pre-
vent standards and assessments that are disjointed and do not 
cohere into a whole.
Giyoo Hatano and Kayoko Inagaki (1986) distinguished two 
types of expertise that are relevant to choice-based assessments: 
routine expertise and adaptive expertise. For recurrent situations of 
low variability, people can develop routine expertise: a set of 
rapid, consistent, and error-free routines. Hatano and his col-
league Keiko Osawa (1983), for example, found that abacus 
masters could mentally add and subtract twelve-digit num-
bers presented two seconds apart, and had double the working 
Standards for Twenty-First-Century Learning Choices 85
memory for digits compared to the rest of the world. The abacus 
masters, through years of concerted practice, had developed 
an internal image of the abacus, which they used to track the 
quantities.
In the same study, Hatano and Osawa found that the aston-
ishing skills of the abacus masters were highly specific and 
dependent on stable settings. The masters’ working memory 
advantage was confined to digits—it disappeared for words and 
letters. Moreover, the abacus masters were intolerant of disrup-
tion, and they did not appear to use their skills to excel at other 
forms of mathematics. The abacus masters had developed exper-
tise for a specific routine.
The dependence of these experts on routines led Hatano and 
his colleagues to propose adaptive expertise, which differs from 
the routine expertise of the abacus masters. Adaptive expertise is 
more appropriate for situations of high variability. Rather than 
replicating efficient routines, adaptive experts vary their behav-
iors and understanding in response to a changing environment. 
Hatano and Inagaki enumerated some of the characteristics of 
adaptive expertise that differentiate it from routine expertise: 
the ability to verbalize the principles underlying one’s skills; the 
ability to judge conventional and unconventional versions of 
skills as appropriate; and the ability to modify or invent skills 
according to local constraints. Others have added to this list 
(e.g., deliberate practice, Ericsson, Krampe, and Tesch-Römer 
1993; prospective adaptation, Martin and Schwartz 2009).
Schwartz, Bransford, and Sears (2005) built on Hatano’s 
work to create the simple learning framework in figure 7.2. This 
framework distinguishes different outcomes of learning and 
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the trajectories that lead to them. The horizontal dimension 
emphasizes efficiency at specific tasks. Efficiency is especially 
important for recurrent situations, where it is better to rapidly 
and accurately remember as well as apply a solution, instead 
of figuring it out over and over again. The trajectory along this 
dimension leads to routine expertise, which comprises a set of 
efficient skills and retrieval patterns that are high on accuracy 
and speed with low variability in execution.
There are many topics in education that rightfully target rou-
tine expertise. The characteristic of those topics is that we can 
reasonably anticipate a stable performance environment in the 
future. In English, for instance, the letters are always read left to 
right, there is a space between words, and more generally, text 
appears in a stable format that permits a high degree of optimiza-
tion. Good readers have developed such high efficiency for decod-































A broader learning framework for thinking about instruction, standards, 
and assessments (adapted from Schwartz, Bransford, and Sears 2005)
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when the readers try to avoid it (Stroop 1935). Highly efficient 
routines are important; struggles with decoding can interfere with 
reading for meaning (e.g., National Research Council 2007).
The vertical dimension in figure 7.2 stresses innovation expe-
riences that involve handling novelty and variation. If students 
will have to adapt to a changing future, then they will need 
experiences that prepare them to invent new ways of under-
standing and doing things. Training the mastery of a given skill 
will not be sufficient. People need to be prepared to adapt—that 
is, learn something new.
A proposal embodied in figure 7.2 is that simply having stu-
dents engage in innovative experiences is not sufficient to put 
them on a trajectory to adaptive expertise. Innovation without 
a strong body of understanding and efficient skills leads to inap-
propriate invention. Many readers have probably encountered 
“that guy” in meetings—the one who merrily brainstorms use-
less ideas and solutions, because he has no understanding of the 
constraints or topic. That guy is an annoying novice.
The optimal adaptability corridor (OAC) illustrates the goal of 
integrating experiences that support both efficiency and inno-
vation. Many discussions in education pit these against each 
other—for example, discovery learning versus training (Tobias 
and Duffy 2009). This is a mistake, because there are different 
processes associated with efficiency and innovation, and there-
fore they do not displace one another. People need a balance 
of both. Adaptive experts are presumably high on both dimen-
sions, with a strong set of efficient schemata and skills that they 
can adapt to handle new situations as well as challenges (e.g., 
Hatano and Inagaki 1986; Wineburg 1998).
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The qualitative hypothesis of the OAC is that the balance 
of efficiency and innovation often works best when innova-
tion experiences precede efficiency-oriented instruction that 
focuses on accuracy. If students learn the efficient solutions 
first, they will have little need to innovate and can miss what 
is novel (Schwartz, Chase, Oppezzo, and Chin 2011). But if they 
first attempt to innovate their own solution, they will develop 
a better appreciation of the relevant context and problem. This 
prepares them for future learning from formal expositions. 
When the efficient solutions are presented, students will appre-
ciate why those solutions work so well.
Many undergraduate engineering and science programs 
spend the first 3.5 years teaching the efficient analytics (math), 
and then in the final semester students at last get to design or 
discover something. Using the framework in figure 7.2, stu-
dents travel along the efficiency dimension for many years 
before they finally have innovation experiences. According to 
the OAC, it would be better to interleave efficiency- and inno-
vation-oriented experiences. For instance, Jared Taylor, Karen 
Smith, Adrian van Stolk, and George Spiegelman (2010) found 
that compared to standard efficiency-oriented instruction, stu-
dents who received a full course that involved inventing models 
in a college-level cell biology course (prior to receiving the rele-
vant lectures) were more able to generate explanations for novel 
cell phenomena without any loss to their basic mastery of the 
course content. They were being better prepared for the explan-
atory work of real scientists.
For those skills and competencies that can reasonably antici-
pate a stable future and high repetition, the simplest and most 
appropriate assessment is to ask people to complete the task as 
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fast as possible, with the fewest errors, with the least variability, 
and in a context as similar to the future performance context as 
possible. This would be the aforementioned approach of using 
SPS assessments, which measure movement along the horizon-
tal dimension toward routine expertise and a high degree of 
mastery. Most knowledge and skills-based assessments take this 
form, and they are appropriate to the goal.
For competencies that cannot presuppose a stable future but 
instead will require adaptation, assessments should target the 
trajectory toward adaptive expertise. Choice-based assessments 
of students’ preparation for future learning are appropriate. 
They examine the processes that students use to adapt, learn, 
and move along the diagonal.
As one example, a good assessment of student preparation 
for future learning asks students to choose what information 
they would like to receive so they can learn about a new topic 
(Bransford and Schwartz 1999). In a recent study (Arena 2012), 
community college students were randomly assigned to one of 
three conditions: a control condition in which they did noth-
ing, a game condition in which they played fifteen hours of the 
commercial video game Call of Duty 2, and a game condition in 
which they played fifteen hours of the commercial video game 
Civilization IV. Both Call of Duty and Civilization are relevant to 
World War II.
On an immediate SPS posttest of their factual knowledge 
about World War II, the three conditions did not look differ-
ent. By this measure, playing the video games had little value. 
The study also included two PFL assessments. The first took 
the familiar format from chapter 5. Students in the three con-
ditions received a lecture on World War II to see if the games 
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had prepared students for future learning. On the postlecture 
test, comprised of questions drawn from standardized tests, 
the game-playing students showed greater gains from the lec-
ture. The PFL format of the test showed that students who had 
played the games were more prepared to learn about World War 
II, while the earlier SPS assessment missed these tacit effects of 
game playing. The second PFL assessment, which focused on the 
students’ choice of questions, yielded a more precise description 
of their likely learning trajectory. Students from all three condi-
tions were told historic battle scenarios from World War II. They 
were asked what questions they would like answered so they 
could understand what happened. Students who had played 
Civilization asked questions about the relationships among the 
nations in the scenarios (e.g., French and British), which makes 
sense because Civilization is a high-level strategy game. Students 
who had played Call of Duty asked questions about the local tac-
tics of the battle, which also makes sense because Call of Duty is 
a first-person shooter game. Thus, the choice-based assessment 
that asked what students would like to know provided a good 
metric of the effects of their learning experiences and likely 
learning trajectory in the future.
The adaptive expertise framework is a high-level organiza-
tion of major goals of instruction and therefore possible assess-
ments. Hopefully it clarifies the province of knowledge-based 
assessments (routine expertise) versus choice-based ones (adap-
tive expertise) as well as the learning experiences that comple-
ment each.
The framework in figure 7.2 is a high-level abstraction. It 
is important to also have midlevel principles to close the gap 
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between the abstract framework and nitty-gritty empiricism of 
assessment. This is the goal of the next section.
The ABCs of Twenty-First-Century Competencies
Adaptive expertise seems highly relevant to recent discussions 
about the skills and competencies needed for the twenty-first 
century. Proposals range from increased creativity to improved 
social skills as well as many others. The catalyst for generating 
lists of twenty-first-century skills comes from a realization that 
times have changed and will continue to do so. The lists are 
responsive to a vision of a future filled with rapid changes in 
work, communication, global interdependence, technology, 
and ideally learning. In this future, individuals’ abilities to 
adapt to changes along with their abilities to innovate those 
rapid changes will largely be a function of their abilities to 
make effective learning choices.
The idea of twenty-first-century skills—twenty-first cen-
tury or not—has captured the imagination of many. Lists of 
twenty-first-century skills often focus on innovation (the ver-
tical dimension from figure 7.2), which has been lacking in 
many standards. These skills have not been well operationalized 
into assessments, however, in part because of the hegemony of 
knowledge-based assessments. Choice-based assessments suit 
the gist of twenty-first-century skills because they embody an 
inherently dynamic perspective that matches the realization 
that people will need to continue to learn and adapt.
The list of twenty-first-century skills and competencies needs 
to be actionable if it is meant to do more than sort students by 
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their abilities. The skills have to be amenable to instruction and 
assessment. Oftentimes, there are confusions about which of 
the competencies can be taught. For example, many people pro-
pose that creativity is an innate personality trait rather than a 
learnable skill (e.g., Barron and Harrington 1981; Gough 1979). 
This is the wrong way to think about these competencies. The 
question instead is whether people choose to engage in them. 
In his review of creativity, Robert Sternberg (2006, 97) states, 
“Creativity is in large part a decision that anyone can make but 
that few people actually do make because they find the costs to 
be too high.” From this perspective, people can learn to make 
the choice to be creative, assuming there are environments that 
support this choice.
If we were in charge of the world, which we are decidedly not, 
we would create a different type of list for twenty-first-century 
competencies. The list would emphasize ways of learning and 
adapting, and the choices to do so. We would call it the ABCs of 
learning choices to help people remember them. For each letter, 
there would be a description of a core mechanic for learning and 
the specific outcome of that mechanic. (“Core mechanic” is a 
term from game design. It refers to a game’s driving interaction 
and its goal, such as shooting an enemy to stay alive.) Ideally, 
education would provide experiences in how and when to choose 
these different learning mechanics, plus what learning outcome 
one can reasonably anticipate. For example, making analogies is 
an excellent way to promote the transfer of learning from one 
topic to another, but it is a poor way to improve automaticity. 
Deliberate practice is a good way to improve automaticity, yet it 
is a poor way to improve transfer. Here are some ideas for the first 
few letters. In each case, there is a body of literature that describes 
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how these work, what to do, and what to expect as a learning out-




















Debating which of these learning choices should be on the 
list of “twenty-first-century learning choices” strikes us as a pro-
ductive exercise. The ABCs provide research-proven methods 
of learning that help people grow and adapt in specific ways. 
If fleshed out for specific topics and contexts (as we discuss 
below), the ABCs would make up a precise set of standards that 
94 Chapter 7
would prepare students to become both efficient and adaptive. 
In this case, teaching to the test would entail teaching students 
how to learn for different desired outcomes.
It is important to avoid thinking that the ABCs are general 
learning skills that rise above specific domains of learning. There 
is a literature on “learning to learn” that refers to domain-gen-
eral study skills (e.g., Olivier and Bolwer 1996). But few learn-
ing skills are truly domain general because they typically work 
better in some situation than others. For example, when learn-
ing to decode words, we want to emphasize learning techniques 
that improve automaticity. But when it comes to philosophy, 
automatic responses are probably a bad outcome.
A nice case in point comes from Sam Wineburg (1991) in 
his comparison of college students and professional histori-
ans. Working individually, they each received a set of source 
documents and had to explain what happened at the Battle 
of Lexington. The historians in the study were not experts in 
American history but they were trained in the routines of histor-
ical analysis. They did not assume that the words in each docu-
ment were true; instead, they attempted to better understand 
the intent of the authors and the historical context in which 
the works were written. In contrast, college students did not 
attempt to explore and understand the perspective behind each 
data source; they tried to understand the documents based on 
their own experiences. The college students were using a general 
learning-to-learn strategy that they had gained over many years 
of schooling—namely, use current background knowledge to 
comprehend a text (Bransford and Johnson 1971; Anderson and 
Pearson 1984). It is a good strategy, but it does not apply to all 
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learning domains, as in the case of interpreting historical docu-
ments. To understand the intent of an author from another era 
or culture, one often needs to learn new information about the 
social, cultural, and political conditions that existed when state-
ments were made.
When it comes to learning as well as assessing learning 
choices, it is important to avoid the assumption of general skills 
and dispositions of learning that apply to any context. Using 
the preceding framework of adaptive expertise, an ideal assess-
ment would look at students’ choices as they learn specific con-
tent to see how well they are moving on a trajectory of adaptive 
expertise in that domain of endeavor.
Similarly, the ABCs should not be taught or assessed in decon-
textualized ways. Different types of learning strategies should 
be tied instead to contexts and practices where they are most 
appropriate. For example, we can make a matrix of the recent 
Common Core State Standards (http://www.corestandards 
.org), which present a national set of standards. At a rarified 
level, an assessment framework might look something like the 

















The noticeable aspect of the matrix is that learning mechan-
ics have been integrated into the standards. Introducing learn-
ing mechanics into the standards encourages instruction on 
learning strategies, because the choice-based assessments 
would examine students’ choices to use these types of learning 
mechanics. Tying learning mechanics to the content standards 
provides valuable guidance to assessment designers through 
stronger constraints on what is being measured.
Currently, standards include statements of what students 
should know or be able to do with their knowledge when they 
have finished learning. It is curious that standards include 
these loud directives regarding knowledge outcomes, but are 
silent about the means of learning. This exclusion may be a 
leftover from earlier times, when the science of learning had 
not matured as much as it has. Old (and not so old, but tired) 
debates about learning seem to pit one model against another, 
as though one size fits all topics and goals, and the big trick is 
to figure out just which size it is. Times have changed. One of 
the crucial discoveries of the past fifty years has been the realiza-
tion of the many different systems that people have for learn-
ing and how they work for different domains of learning (e.g., 
implicit versus explicit learning; Schacter 1987). The learning 
sciences have revealed a great deal about the many different 
ways that people learn, and what each approach confers for dif-
ferent topics.
Developing a trajectory in any domain of endeavor requires 
several types of learning, ranging from skill acquisition to inter-
est development to conceptual growth to domain-specific habits 
of mind. Key enablers of these trajectories are the participatory 
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structures and range of resources available to learners (Ito et al. 
2009). Unfortunately, most introductory college courses in sci-
ence and mathematics serve a singular diet of lectures followed 
by problem sets followed by quizzes, midterms, and finals. This 
model of instruction, which is quickly becoming the new college 
textbook in video form (e.g., http://www.udacity.com), cannot 
achieve all the important learning goals of instruction. Rather, 
it feeds directly into knowledge-based assessments of facts and 
procedural fluency in problem solving. To create vibrant class-
rooms that engage as many students as possible, faculty should 
overcome the inertia of historical habits passed from generation 
to generation. Explicitly including different ways of learning as 
a component of standards (or any curricular definition) would 
go a long way in overcoming inertia and helping faculty and 
students develop a deeper understanding of how people learn. 
Grounding these standards in choice-based assessments would 
provide clear targets to help educators understand the goals of 
instruction.

IV Matters of Practice

8 The Tangle of Reliability and Reification
Many assessment questions are built on intuitions. For exam-
ple, questions at the end of a chapter are often based on an 
author’s sense of what would help students study more pro-
ductively. Test banks that come with packaged curricula are fre-
quently manufactured in odd ways, such as randomly sampling 
sentences from a textbook and then making one question per 
sampled sentence.
High-stakes assessments are another matter. The question 
formats may be similar to more intuitively developed tests (e.g., 
multiple-choice word problems), but there are stronger back-
end methodologies for warranting that assessments measure 
what people think they are measuring. The stakes are higher, 
and the enterprise is much larger. The Educational Testing Ser-
vice, with over twenty-five hundred employees, delivers fifty 
million tests per year.
The Educational Testing Service produces many creative 
products that measure all manner of human behavior. But the 
creativity and insight of these measures is not what gets com-
municated to the public or the average test maker. As Robert 
Mislevy, Linda Steinberg, and Russell Almond (2003, 2) put 
it, “Three decades of progress in fields that are central to 
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assessment—cognitive psychology, measurement models, infor-
mation technology, and learning in the disciplines—have had 
surprisingly little impact on everyday practice.” People instead 
experience the same old test formats that were originally devel-
oped as simple solutions to formal problems in test develop-
ment, such as reliability. In this section, we describe some of the 
unintended consequences that result from an assessment enter-
prise that has largely evolved to characterize individual differ-
ences and then sort learners with respect to these differences. 
We provide a brief tutorial on some technical practices of assess-
ment development before moving forward to newer approaches 
in chapter 9 that we think can undo some of the unintended 
mischief done by current assessment methodologies. For exam-
ple, rather than using assessments to sort students based on 
individual differences, it may work better to use them to sort 
the quality of learning experiences.
Constructs
Much of the formal work in human measurement revolves 
around constructs. A construct is “a product of informed scien-
tific imagination, an idea developed to permit categorization 
and description of some directly observable behavior” (Crocker 
and Algina 1986, 230). Intelligence is an example of a construct. 
So is “knowledge that the earth is round” as well as “personal 
identification with science.” None of these mental states can 
be directly observed in their totality, so they must be inferred 
from a sample of a person’s behavior. One can see markers of 
intelligence, knowledge, and identification. But the construct 
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is more than a single manifestation. The broader construct is 
the “product of informed scientific imagination.” The imagina-
tion yields an argument that various observations cohere into 
something more fundamental that is responsible for producing 
a constellation of behaviors.
The Nobel physicist Leon Lederman (with Teresi 1993) pro-
vides a useful analogy for understanding the challenge of find-
ing invisible constructs—in his case for subnuclear particles. 
He describes aliens (the Twilo) who come to earth and happen 
on a soccer match. They cannot see the colors black and white, 
which means they cannot see the soccer ball. They can see the 
players running, the goalie falling to the ground, and the crowd 
cheering. Their task is to figure out what organizes all these 
behaviors—that is, they need to infer the existence of a ball. It 
takes an inspired leap to posit an invisible construct. Moreover, 
once one posits the construct, it is necessary to decide which 
evidence is relevant and could confirm or falsify the existence 
of the construct.
The task of test makers is not that different. A person, 
researcher, or group of people may propose a construct such 
as “scientific identification.” Because it is a new idea, the pur-
ported properties of the construct are poorly understood; it is 
not clear who has it or how much; and the measures that would 
reveal its existence are also unknown. It is a hard endeavor. The 
construct of intelligence provides an excellent example. Every-
body has some intuitive sense that they can tell when they 
are talking to someone smart. Yet after years and years of test 
development and theorizing, there is no consensus on whether 
there is one intelligence construct or many. Nobody really 
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knows what IQ tests measure other than performance on a test 
that is labeled “intelligence quotient.” Even so, the IQ test has 
captured the beliefs of so many. The test (or any of its many 
modern variants) has become the construct of intelligence in the 
public mind, despite the fact that there is no scientific consen-
sus on the construct itself. Here, we begin to see the reifying 
power of tests.
Validity
We can separate two criteria for a useful assessment: validity and 
reliability. All assessments are beholden to them. Validity and 
reliability are concepts for ensuring that the chain of reasoning 
from test scores to constructs is as strong as possible.
Validity is roughly analogous to accuracy. It refers to the 
extent to which scores on a test are actually related to the con-
struct under investigation. A geography test that measures the 
time it takes each student to run a hundred yards might reliably 
sort the students into roughly the same order each time it is 
given, but it would not be a valid test of geography knowledge.
A good assessment reveals behavioral patterns that are valid 
warrants for the presence, absence, or strength of a particular 
construct in an individual. Mislevy, Steinberg, and Almond 
(2003) have developed a framework called evidence-centered 
design to help the designers of assessments navigate these com-
plex waters. Evidence-centered design is a framework for devel-
oping and using tests that embrace the notion of assessment as 
an argument, or part of a chain of claims, supporting the char-
acterization of a construct in a person. It includes various stages, 
but the core logic involves machinery to link up the following 
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five components: a student model representing the constructs of 
interest, evidence models representing the relationships between 
those constructs and various behaviors, task models represent-
ing discrete tasks intended to serve as instances of the behav-
iors in the evidence models, an assembly model describing how 
to combine tasks appropriately to form a coherent assessment 
(an assessment is typically a combination of measures), and a 
presentation model describing how the assessment is presented 
to and completed by test takers. Evidence-centered design help-
fully unpacks an argument logic that is familiar to experimental 
psychologists but may be foreign to assessment designers.
Reliability
There have been great advances in the field of psychometrics, 
yet there is a problem sitting in the middle of it all. It involves 
the concept of reliability. Reliability has a technical meaning, 
but basically it can be thought of as analogous to precision. It 
refers to the extent to which scores on a test remain consis-
tent over time within a sample as well as the extent to which 
the items that make up the test all seem to be measuring the 
same thing (“hanging together” or “pointing in the same 
direction”). The basic statistic is an association (i.e., correla-
tion). If people are high on one test item, are they high on all 
the other items from that test that claim to measure the same 
construct? If so, the test hangs together, and the warrant that 
there is a construct behind the performances on all the items 
is increased.
To see if the assessment is stable, a simple solution is to 
show that a person performs similarly on a test over several 
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administrations. Unlike a yardstick, which has the property of 
length, a behavioral test does not have the property of interest. 
An IQ test is not smart. To ensure that a test is a stable index of 
a property, the test has to be taken. It has to be taken repeat-
edly, ideally by the same person, to ensure it gives the same 
measure. This way, one can rest assured that the assessment is 
immune to error introduced by the time of day, the mood of 
the test taker, or a host of other variables that mean the test is 
picking up some qualities not associated with the construct. If 
evaluators are trying to get a good fix on a person, they want to 
be sure that their measures do not exhibit slippage. If a person 
could show that the SAT gave different results at different times, 
and a university relied on SAT scores for admissions, one can 
imagine the legal battles. No one wants to use a yardstick that 
keeps changing its size from measure to measure.
Reliability is important. Through an unlucky coincidence 
(or maybe not a coincidence), however, the methodologi-
cal demand of reliability coincides with a tendency of people 
to take an essentialist perspective that reifies assessments into 
stable traits or essences of a person—individual properties that 
do not change. Ray McDermott (1993) ironically describes how 
disability constructs “acquire” children, which in turn defines 
the children going forward, both inwardly and outwardly. Rei-
fied individual properties can range from disabilities to mas-
tered knowledge to personality types to intelligence.
The combination of the need for a stable assessment and the 
simplicity of thinking in terms of stable traits can yield useful 
scientific advances. For example, a good deal of personality 
research focuses on the “Big Five” personality traits: openness, 
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conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism 
(Costa and McCrae 1992). There is even research that shows a 
correlation between the volume of specific brain regions and 
different personality types (DeYoung et al. 2010). But know-
ing that people have/are/derive from these five traits does not 
do much for improving learning. The assumption is that these 
five are stable personality traits, and therefore, the trait con-
structs seem misaligned with the goal of designing instruction 
to change them.
One unsuccessful way to use traits to improve learning is 
to assume that different types of people require different types 
of instruction. If someone is a “spatial thinker,” for example, 
then they should receive “spatial instruction.” Alas, this belief 
does not correspond well to current evidence when consider-
ing nonclinical populations. A contemporary form of the belief 
comes in the guise of learning styles: different people have dif-
ferent ways they learn best, as though a learning style were a 
fixed trait. The problem is that there is minimal evidence that 
shows that learning styles is a useful idea (Massa and Mayer 
2006). Despite its capture of the public mind, to our knowledge 
nobody has convincingly shown the key attribute-treatment 
interaction. Such an interaction would show that some stable 
attribute, trait, or essence of the learner determines which type 
of treatment or instruction is the most effective. For instance, 
nobody has found that a “spatial” person learns better from 
spatial material than verbal material, or vice versa. The clos-
est example that we know of has been the demonstration that 
low-IQ students benefit from well-organized material, whereas 
high-IQ students benefit from less-organized material (Snow 
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1989). (The high-IQ students work harder to untangle the less-
organized material, which leads to deeper processing.) We can 
only imagine explaining to parents that it is better to confuse 
instruction for smart kids, rather than just giving the smart kids 
advanced materials that are well organized. In general, good 
instruction works for most everyone who does not have clinical-
level difficulties.
The fact that some constructs, such as personality or intel-
ligence, claim high reliability has unintended consequences 
on learning. Carol Dweck and her colleagues (Blackwell, Trzes-
niewski, and Dweck 2007) have documented that a good por-
tion of the school population has reified the construct of 
intelligence. These people believe their intelligence is a fixed 
essence. When they fail at a task, they think that they are not 
smart enough and cannot change. As a result, they do not per-
sist and do not learn. They are thinking, “What’s the use of 
trying?” Intelligence is an unproductive construct when it 
comes to choosing to learn. Like other trait ascriptions, intelli-
gence does not help people appreciate contextual supports and 
hindrances to their development (cf. Barab and Plucker 2002). 
And of course, the issue of assigning traits is not limited to intel-
ligence and personality. The same problem shows up in knowl-
edge domains, as when someone says, “I’m not a math person.”
Interestingly, Dweck has found a way to ameliorate the 
effects with her Brainology program (http://www.mindsetworks 
.com/brainology). She helps children understand that their 
brains can change, for example, by explaining how neurons 
grow and connect. As a result, students exhibit more mastery 
behaviors, where they try to understand rather than give up. An 
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interesting aspect of this solution is that it switches the narrative 
of learning. Rather than being about an essentialist construct of 
intelligence based on reliable IQ tests and reified abilities, this 
biological model provides an alternative interpretative frame-
work for learning, much like we are trying to do with choice.
Education is about change through learning, yet our assess-
ments need to demonstrate stable constructs. How can we solve 
this paradox? As we argued in chapter 5, one solution is to 
assess the dynamic process of learning per se as opposed to a 
static, easily ossified construct like knowledge. The next chapter 
describes two complementary alternatives.

9 New Approaches to Assessment Design
Sorting Experiences and Not Only Students
Current assessments are like rainwater on a roof, looking for a 
leak. Wherever there is a crack, they find a way to seep into peo-
ple’s beliefs about themselves. Changing the fundamental goal 
of assessments may help everyone stay a little drier. Most assess-
ments are designed to sort students, which leads to personal 
attributions based on the test. Students can be sorted from best 
to worst (norm-referenced tests), or they can be sorted above 
or below some criterion of performance (criterion-referenced 
tests). We can change this function of assessments, though.
Rather than primarily designing assessments to sort learners, 
we can design them to sort learning experiences. In this applica-
tion, the primary goal of the assessment is to draw an inference 
about the quality of a learning situation, and a secondary goal 
can be for drawing an inference about a child. This reverses the 
usual prioritization of assessment design, and could alleviate the 
natural tendency to identify people by virtue of a test.
Sorting situations is a well-known strategy for research-
ers who want to compare different forms of instruction. They 
might run an experiment where they implement two different 
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types of instruction. Ideally, they have a strong situational con-
struct that differentiates the two instructional treatments (e.g., 
the presence or absence of hands-on materials). They then look 
at student performances on a posttest. The goal is to make an 
inference toward the nature of instruction instead of any indi-
vidual child. One of the appeals of this approach is that it yields 
actionable information about how to change the learning situ-
ation. So rather than thinking of how multiple items converge 
into a description of a child (e.g., from a ninety-minute survey 
with a mind-numbing proliferation of repetitive questions), the 
thought is how multiple students converge into a description of 
instruction using relatively few test items.
The important distinction here is whether an assessment is 
primarily intended to compare test takers—say, to sort students 
into advanced and remedial courses of math instruction—or 
experiences—to determine whether a new way of teaching math 
produces greater learning gains than standard practice. (It is key 
to note that because of the higher stakes involved, tests used 
in evaluations of individual test takers are rightfully subjected 
to greater scrutiny than are tests used in evaluations of experi-
ences.) In the context of our discussion of choice-based assess-
ment, we are primarily concerned with the latter type of test. We 
are more interested in discovering which features and arrange-
ments of learning environments contribute to learning than 
we are in characterizing individual differences in learning pro-
ficiency. In our experience, knowing how to teach has a stronger 
effect than knowing which child has done poorly on a test. If we 
do not know what constitutes effective instruction, then know-
ing that a child has not learned does not get us very far.
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Currently, assessments are predicated on person-level con-
structs. We do not fully understand why this is the case, 
though some of it has to do with the rise of individual differ-
ences research in psychology and the public belief about what is 
important to study. The certification of individuals is also a cru-
cial function of assessments. A driving test certifies an individ-
ual as a capable driver who knows the rules of the road. Without 
a certification process, there would be more accidents (although 
clearly, our driving assessments are not perfect, which is one 
reason California does not permit unchaperoned teenagers to 
drive with other teenagers in the car). But if certification and 
stratification are their only functions, assessments designed to 
sort people instead of learning experiences miss the formative 
goals of assessments (Black and Williams 1998). Feedback from 
assessments should inform the design of and practices within 
the learning environment so learners can do better (e.g., Ander-
son, Zuiker, Taasoobshirazi, and Hickey 2011).
Many assessment efforts do attempt to provide feedback for 
evaluating the quality of learning experiences. For example, 
the PISA, an international test, is used to sort how well nations 
are educating their children. State-mandated tests are often 
used to evaluate how well different schools are functioning. 
In California, we receive children’s performances on standard-
ized tests, and the newspaper reports the overall performance 
of the school. Unfortunately, these reports are based on indi-
vidual knowledge constructs, of which students have varying 
quantities.
Current assessment constructs locate knowledge in the 
head, and therefore one cannot locate the constructs in the 
114 Chapter 9
environment. For instance, if students in school A do not know 
that 2 + 2 = 4, how do we locate the equivalent “knowledge” 
construct at the classroom level? Would we see what words or 
mathematical symbols the teacher or textbook is using? This 
does not constitute knowledge. Words are not knowledge. 
Words don’t know anything. Given a finding that children at 
a school do not know basic math facts, one cannot infer much 
about the classroom learning experiences. Maybe the class-
rooms have lots of math words, but the instruction using those 
words is poor. Ideally, there would be assessments of learners 
that support stronger inferences about the nature of their learn-
ing experiences.
The mission of the Common Core Standards states that its 
goal is to “provide a consistent, clear understanding of what 
students are expected to learn, so teachers and parents know 
what they need to do help them” (http://www.corestandards 
.org). We suspect that most of the assessments that will be asso-
ciated with these standards will not permit the desired bridge 
between standards and action. Knowledge-based assessments do 
not solve the problem of guiding teachers and parents to figure 
out “what they need to do.” The constructs are largely about 
knowledge; they are not constructs one can use to describe a 
learning experience.
A simple solution is to use “process-oriented” constructs 
rather than knowledge-based ones. Making the constructs 
about processes of learning as captured through learning 
choices would enable a more direct translation between indi-
vidual and classroom processes of learning. One could observe 
the processes of learning used in class and map them to the 
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processes of learning that an individual uses to learn on the 
test, and vice versa. For example, we might observe the use of 
inquiry in a science classroom. We can also make choice-based 
assessments of individual’s choices to use inquiry to learn. The 
construct of using inquiry to learn would span both the class-
room and individual level. If the students from a given school 
or classroom did not use inquiry to learn in an individual 
assessment, it seems likely that one could look at their learning 
experiences and then find that those experiences also do not 
include sufficient opportunities and supports to use inquiry to 
learn. An assessment of individuals could help us more directly 
infer their learning experiences (and an assessment of learn-
ing experiences could help us infer what students are likely 
to learn). A recent national framework for science standards 
(National Research Council 2012) moves in this direction by 
proposing the inclusion of practices of scientists into the stan-
dards, not just content knowledge. Practices are largely observ-
able processes.
Of course, assessing processes or practices will require 
increased specificity in the characterization of practices/pro-
cesses that can occur on both the social and individual plane. 
Saying that students engage in “inquiry” is too vague, for 
both instruction and assessment. There is a growing pocket of 
research that describes specific social-process constructs rel-
evant to individual processes of learning. For example, Yackel 
and Cobb (1996) differentiated norms for general classroom 
discussion from those for mathematical discussion. There are 
also a growing number of rubrics for describing classroom-level 
process constructs (e.g., La Paro, Pianta, and Stuhlman 2004). 
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One particularly interesting case comes from Lindsay Richland, 
Osnat Zur, and Keith Holyoak (2007). They examined video-
tapes of mathematics instruction across different nations. They 
were looking for the use of techniques that helped students 
draw analogies during instruction—things like gesturing back 
and forth between examples. The US schools looked different 
from other nations. The difference was not in the actual number 
of analogies that teachers introduced. Rather, the difference 
was that the US teachers did not provide support for making 
the connections. One might imagine that on assessment of the 
choice to use analogies to learn, their students would also do 
relatively poorly.
Focus on Improvement Rather than Proof
The goal of science is to prove. The goal of assessment is to 
improve. People often forget this. For example, see which 
answer you would choose to the following complex analogy:
Science : Engineering : Architecture is analogous to : :
(a) Learning Theory : Instruction : Assessment
(b) Assessment : Learning Theory : Instruction
(c) Instruction : Assessment : Learning Theory
(d) Assessment : Instruction : Learning Theory
Our answer is (a). Science is about the causes and consequences 
of learning. Engineering is about how to use the science of learn-
ing to build instruction. Architecture involves deciding what to 
engineer, which is the implicit role assessments have taken. If 
you chose answer (b) or (d), you must be a psychometrician.
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Oftentimes, the psychometrics of assessment bogs down in 
proof to the detriment of improvement. In an invited paper 
written to his peers via the Journal of Educational and Behavioral 
Statistics, Wainer (2010, 12–13) declared, “The psychometrics of 
today is both more extensive and better than we need. . . . If 
we want to improve the practice of testing, there is much more 
bang for the buck to be had in improving tests than improving 
test theory.”
Test evaluation frequently depends on inferential statistics 
such as t-tests and F-tests, which are designed to (dis)prove a 
hypothesis. The strict inferential statistics for establishing con-
structs, reliability, and validity can choke innovation. If we let 
go of inferential statistics and dreams of proof, we can embrace 
a new set of data-mining tools for handling behavioral data. 
These tools are exploratory and meant to aid human induction 
rather than (dis)prove hypotheses. They detect patterns within 
large data sets, and then it is up to subsequent research to deter-
mine if these patterns are valid and reliable. Choice-based 
assessments are prime candidates for data mining, because they 
collect large amounts of data by recording each click a student 
makes while learning.
Industry has already embraced the methodology of ana-
lyzing people’s choice behaviors on the Internet using data 
mining (Tancer 2008). Data mining provides a way to search 
for previously unknown patterns in mountains of data. The 
patterns can then be put to use. In one apocryphal story (Power 
2002), a grocery store chain looked at which items customers 
tended to purchase together. Many expected pairings cropped 
up, including milk with cereal and shampoo with conditioner, 
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but one came as a surprise: diapers with beer were often pur-
chased together between 5:00 and 7:00 p.m. It was concluded 
that fathers sent to the store for diapers rewarded them-
selves for their errand by buying beer. The grocery store chain 
responded to this discovery by moving beer nearer to diapers 
in its stores, boosting sales. Whether or not this legend is true, 
it illustrates the potential utility of data mining—a computer 
search discovers unanticipated patterns that are then offered 
up for human inspection.
One data-mining technique, affinity analysis, yields results 
that are familiar to anyone who shops at Amazon.com. Amazon 
knows that customers who buy item A are more likely to buy 
item B, so it will display item B to customers who are currently 
looking at item A. Another type of data mining is called clas-
sification analysis. An example comes from online gaming. 
Many online games are free to play but offer in-game purchases, 
from which the game makers derive the revenue. Most play-
ers spend very little on in-game purchases. The revenue comes 
from “whales”: those people who spend freely on upgrades and 
custom game features. The classification challenge is to identify 
the whales as early as possible, so that resources can be focused 
on keeping the whales happy. This is an automated analog of 
the practice of identifying and catering to whales in gambling—
in fact, the term comes from the casino industry.
Data mining provides a new set of tools for handling com-
plex behaviors. Portions of the psychometric community have 
embraced the challenge of handling rich data. Witness the 
enthusiastic preface to Automated Scoring of Complex Tasks in 
Computer-Based Testing (Williamson, Mislevy, and Bejar 2006, 2):
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The technological advances of the past decade are a catalyst for change 
in educational measurement. They allow increased flexibility, com-
plexity, interactivity and realism of computer-administered assessment 
tasks, including multimedia components. Coupled with capabilities for 
internet delivery and its implications for large-scale on-demand admin-
istration, the potential wealth of data that can be tracked and recorded 
from such administrations appears capable of revolutionizing assess-
ment. Such a revolution relies, in part, on the promise of a standardized 
automated analytical approach to measuring previously elusive con-
structs and complex problem-solving behavior. Of course, this promise 
depends on the ability of the measurement profession to address new 
challenges in the practice of educational measurement posed by such an 
approach to assessment.
This passage nicely captures the situation in which the field 
of assessment finds itself. There is a good deal of excitement 
among foundations and researchers. There is a new scholarly 
society dedicated to educational data mining (http://www 
.educationaldatamining.org). We share the writers’ enthusiasm 
about the possibilities for the future of data mining, although 
we do not believe that the pure bottom-up data mining of the 
industrial examples will work well. Assessment environments 
need to be designed up-front to help find the telling patterns 
when there are multiple choices students might make. (We say 
more about this in chapter 10.)
The danger, from our perspective, is that the field will miss 
the opportunity of data mining for changing how we think 
about learning. This would occur if people were to develop data-
mining strategies that try to infer students’ knowledge. Focus-
ing on knowledge would constitute a mistake similar to that 
made by those who see in digital media only the potential for 
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“faster and fancier books” (Kendall-Taylor, Lindland, and Miku-
lak 2010). That is, it would represent a failure to appreciate the 
opportunity presented by new technologies to shift the para-
digm of assessment from the construct of knowledge—a useful 
proxy for the outcomes of interest in education—to choices—
the outcomes of interest themselves.
There are examples of assessments in the psychometric com-
munity that are beginning to move away from an exclusive 
focus on knowledge toward a richer characterization of learning 
behaviors. One such instance is the Packet Tracer instructional 
software application used as part of the Cisco Networking Acad-
emy (Frezzo et al. 2009). Packet Tracer is a simulation environ-
ment that allows users to create and maintain virtual networks 
of computer routers. This makes it an ideal platform for per-
formance assessments of users’ knowledge, skills, and abilities 
in the domain of router administration. It was designed using 
the evidence-centered design framework described in chapter 
8, and it includes authoring capabilities that allow instructors 
to design assessment tasks that are ideally suited for their own 
needs. Packet Tracer is thus exemplary as a cutting-edge knowl-
edge assessment based on logging student data.
Another example of data mining applied to a learning envi-
ronment comes from the IMMEX Project (Stevens and Thadani 
2007). The IMMEX Project hosts an online problem-solving 
environment replete with various multimedia resources. Each 
level consists of several related subproblems and a set of learn-
ing resources including experimental results, reference mate-
rials, and expert (or peer) advice. Students are free to use the 
resources however they see fit. They may choose to look 
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repeatedly at some resources and ignore others, and they may 
explore the resources in any order. The students’ choices of 
whether and how to use the resources along with their accu-
racy on embedded questions are fed into machine-learning 
algorithms to produce student problem-solving models. Student 
performances can be characterized in terms of strategies such as 
guessing (quick, incorrect results with little resource use), per-
severating (combing through resources without achieving cor-
rect results), plodding (the inefficient use of resources leading 
to correct results), and expert performance (using only the most 
useful resources to achieve correct results). The IMMEX Project 
provides a strong illustration of how it is possible to capture and 
catalog learning choices in an open environment.
The ability to identify informative patterns of choice will 
depend on advancements in data mining, which are proliferat-
ing quickly. One new technique (Li and Biswas 2002) looks for 
hidden Markov models (HMM; Rabiner 1989). Automated HMM 
analysis finds recurrent patterns of choices. (Deriving an HMM 
is analogous to performing a factor analysis to reveal the under-
lying structure among the variables, except that in the case 
of HMMs, the structure is the underlying interaction patterns 
and sequential transitions among those patterns.) The patterns 
of interaction are called “hidden” because they do not corre-
spond to any specific choice or transition between states but 
rather larger patterns of choice. Hogyeong Jeong et al. (2008) 
used HMM to analyze learner choices using the Teachable 
Agents software described in chapter 4. (Students teach a com-
puter character, which can then answer questions based on how 
well it has been taught.) In the Teachable Agent environment 
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used for this research, students could choose from among seven 
activities at any given time, and they could leave or return to 
any activity at any time. The goal was to see whether students 
developed patterns of choice, and whether those patterns pre-
dicted future learning.
Figure 9.1 shows the result of an HMM analysis of partici-
pants’ choices. It revealed three major interaction patterns 
labeled in figure 9.1 as basic map building (creating the agent’s 
map), map probing (asking the agent to answer questions), and 
map tracing (asking the agent to explain how it reached its 
answers). The analysis also computed the probabilities of tran-
sitioning from one interaction pattern to another, as indicated 
by the percentages on the links. The top panel depicts HMM 
analyses on two different implementations of the Teachable 
Agent software. The left side represents the choice behavior of 
children who were given corrective feedback about the quality 
of the map they were making (e.g., “The correct answer is that 
algae decrease oxygen”). The right side represents the choice 
behavior of children who were given tips on what activities they 
might choose, given a mistake in their map (e.g., “Ask the agent 
a question, so you can see how it is figuring out the answer”). 
The specific meaning of the interaction patterns is not relevant 
to this discussion; what is important to notice is that the two 
treatments illuminate strikingly different choices for switching 
between one pattern of activity to another (i.e., the percentages 
on the arcs).
The bottom panel displays the children’s learning choices 
six weeks later, when students from both conditions learned a 
new topic. At this time, the corrective feedback and tip feature 
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A data-mining approach to analyzing choice patterns at initial learn-
ing and transfer
Based on a method for deriving HMMs, the top panel shows how stu-
dents chose to move between various clusters of activities. The percent-
ages represent the probabilities that students transition from one 
cluster of activities to another. The left side shows the patterns of stu-
dents who received feedback on their knowledge (accuracy). The right 
side shows the patterns of students who were given tips on activities 
that would help them make better learning choices. The bottom panel 
shows the patterns of choices when students were left to their own 
devices. The notable aspect is that the choices developed during initial 
learning transferred when students were choosing on their own to 
learn a new topic. For example, students in the right panel were much 
more likely to engage in map tracing.
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were turned off, so the children were using identical software to 
learn the new topic. As may be seen, the choice patterns from 
initial learning continued, even though the system no longer 
encouraged one choice pattern over another. The HMM choice 
analysis thus was able to distinguish and track the effects of 
the two treatments. Moreover, students who received tips on 
making learning choices learned more both in the initial learn-
ing period and six weeks later (as measured by standard paper-
and-pencil tests of knowledge).
Therefore, the story is twofold: data mining can help reveal 
how choice is a productive framework for assessing the effects of 
different learning experiences, and learning environments that 
support choice making lead to better learning. New technolo-
gies make architecting and analyzing choice-based assessments 
a productive line for research and development.
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Building a library of choice-based assessments is a massive 
undertaking. There are innumerable learning choices one might 
assess across formal and informal contexts. When high-stakes 
assessments are built, each new item is vetted extensively, often 
by administering it to thousands of participants. Yet here we 
are, proposing the design of a new style of assessment and an 
accompanying framework that entails untold hundreds of new 
items. How can we make this a tractable task? The overarching 
answer is to focus on innovation first, before making the move 
toward efficiency. So rather than trying to make the perfect 
assessment, we need to generate a broader set of possibilities. 
We can prune later.
There are five key challenges. We present them briefly, so the 
reader can (wisely) choose which challenges and solutions to 
learn more about in the following subsections.
1. Convince people that assessing learning choices is an inter-
esting enough idea that it is worth pursuing. That is the point of 
this book.
2. Enlist enough people to work on the problem, so there can 
be a critical mass of innovative assessments. Our solution is to 
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help democratize the creation of assessments rather than leave 
it in the hands of a few.
3. User-test assessment items so that students find them com-
prehensible and engaging. Current assessments employ a few 
well-worn scripts: multiple choice, true/false, fill in the blank, 
short answer, and so on. Everyone knows the scripts, so if a stu-
dent does poorly, we can assume it is due to their lack of knowl-
edge about the topic and not the test format. With new types of 
interactive assessments, we want to be sure we are measuring 
choices about how to achieve a goal instead of measuring aim-
less meandering dedicated to figuring out the interface. Our 
solution to this challenge is to create a crowdsourcing platform 
where it is possible to refine assessments empirically over tens 
of thousands of users.
4. Validate the choice-based assessments. With standard factual 
and procedural tests, there is little question whether a given 
answer is right or wrong. People can rightly ask for the warrant 
that some choices are better than others, however. To solve this 
problem, we describe several research methods suitable to 
formal, informal, and crowdsourcing settings.
5. Decide what to do once an assessment has detected that a 
student is making poor choices. How do we help students make 
correct choices and then see if they learn from that instruction? 
Deciding the best actions we can take to help students learn to 
make good choices is beyond the purview of this book, but if we 
want an assessment to yield actionable information, then the 
assessment should help students, educators, parents, or even a 
well-programmed computer consider candidate actions. More-
over, assessments that drive instructional actions that measur-
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ably improve learning are the strongest possible validation of a 
learning assessment.
A Platform for Democratizing Assessment Creation
There are many sources of interest and capability for creating 
assessments tailored to local goals. One possible population of 
assessment creators comes from a resurgent interest in “merit 
badges” (Collins and Pea 2011). Groups can develop their own 
badging system to indicate accomplishment or experience. 
The reason for the interest is that badges motivate goal setting, 
pride, and reputation. Badges can also motivate persistence 
despite the lack of any prospect for material gain, which helps 
explain the dramatic increase in their use in virtual worlds. 
Badges, if credible, serve as assessments for those who are trying 
to decide whether to hire or admit someone (Advanced Place-
ment courses have become badges for admissions to colleges—
“I must take lots of AP courses so I can prove that I deserve to 
be admitted”). We believe there are many people who are inter-
ested in creating badge systems, and they could serve as one 
source of assessment creation.
Members of online communities are another potential 
source of assessment creators. Gee (2003) describes how online 
gaming communities develop their own standards and tacit 
assessments, much like guilds must have done for apprentices 
and masters. A third great source for assessment development 
comes from game designers, who build assessments that deter-
mine when players can level up. A fourth source is cognitive 
psychologists. Entry into this profession depends on learning 
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how to craft measures that can detect the effects of subtle exper-
imental manipulations. If you want to be famous in the field, 
you develop a new method for measuring human beliefs or per-
formance. Surprisingly, this field has not been engaged in the 
assessment enterprise, but it could be.
We believe there is a great deal of interest in designing assess-
ments. Local experts have a better grasp of what it means to 
choose well in their domain than do the anonymous people 
who make so-called drop-in-from-the-sky (DIFTS) assessments. 
But these experts need tools and resources that facilitate the 
design of assessments, including the opportunity to gather feed-
back and see creative, effective examples made by others.
To this end, we are creating a new environment called Planet 
OhNo! Captain Catastrophe and his dog Oops host this envi-
ronment. The platform is designed for building, refining, and 
administering assessments to children ranging from fourth to 
eighth grade. It can be generalized to many ages by changing 
the overarching narrative and graphic design. The left side of 
figure 10.1 (plate 4) shows the splash page, which is designed 
to be inviting for the target age group. The right side of the 
figure offers a central space that is surrounded by different mis-
adventures. Each misadventure has a number of fanciful disas-
ters waiting to happen (a bear shows up, and your character has 
just been covered in bear marinade; what do you do?). For each 
misadventure, there is a set of associated choicelets. A choicelet, 
as mentioned earlier, is a five- to twenty-minute activity during 
which students can learn new content, some of which is rele-
vant for solving the misadventures.
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The choicelets serve as the primary choice-based assess-
ments. As students complete a choicelet, it is possible to track 
their choice patterns during learning. Ideally, the choicelets are 
engaging in their own right. But just in case they are not, the 
misadventures are fun, and to do well, students can learn how 
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Figure 10.1 (Plate 4)
A platform for crowdsourcing the design of assessments
The left side shows the children’s portal into the environment. The 
right side portrays the main interface where students can access vari-
ous (assessment) games, accumulate points, and so forth. Through 
“kidsourcing,” students play the assessment games, so it is possible to 
refine them. The bottom of the figure depicts some of the graphic 
assets available to anyone who wants to design choice-based assess-
ments in Planet Ohno!
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The goal of the platform is to make it easy for other people to 
create choicelets that can be slotted into the adventures. They 
can attach a choicelet to a misadventure and slot in a “disas-
ter,” where students can handle the misadventure using what 
they learned in the choicelet. Once designers have determined 
whether their choicelet works, they can decouple it from the 
system to use it independently for a specific assessment, or 
they can leave it in the larger environment as one of many 
assessments.
To help democratize the development of choice-based assess-
ments, we added data collection features. The system includes 
automatic data logging into a common framework for subse-
quent analysis by researchers and eventually teachers. There are 
also security, permission, and log-in schemes that permit vari-
ous levels of control and access. For instance, it is possible to 
assign specific misadventures and choicelets to a student. And 
among other features, researchers can have restricted access to 
data from their studies.
To help people design usable assessments, we plan to devel-
ope an authoring system that makes it easy to create interactive 
learning environments that collect process data. The author-
ing system will be of the what-you-see-is-what-you-get vari-
ety, much like Adobe Dreamweaver or Microsoft PowerPoint 
(or even, for those who may remember, Apple’s Hypercard 
system). It will enable people to do layout for various objects 
(text, graphics, or movies) and define common interactions 
(e.g., a back button). For the assessment authoring system, there 
will be an array of built-in libraries for inserting user interac-
tions relevant to assessment. The initial example of a choicelet 
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in chapter 2 uses a catalog that allows students to flip through 
different color charts. The catalog has a generic data and visual 
structure, so designers can change the content of each page. It 
also includes defined data-logging properties, so that it stores 
important actions (choice of a page) rather than irrelevant 
actions (position of cursor). Planet OhNo! also has a library of 
graphic assets including characters and backdrops. The bottom 
of figure 10.1 (plate 4) shows a subset of the characters that pop-
ulate Planet OhNo!
“Kidsourcing” for Refining Assessments
Ideally, with the right set of tools, many people can work on 
designing assessments. A marketplace of creative and shared 
assessments would be a nice change from the current situation. 
One of the most important assets for designing assessments is 
having people use them. People—lots of people—need to take 
the assessments so a designer can find out if they are working 
well. One possible solution is crowdsourcing.
The psychometric community has invested substantial intel-
lectual horsepower to pull forward the logic and statistics of 
assessments. There has been less attention paid to the design 
of item formats, with multiple choice, fill in the blank, and 
occasional essays still being the standard. This is not to say that 
there has been no attention to creating new assessment formats. 
Portfolio assessments, for instance, are an innovative format 
that evaluates student products over a longer timeline.
Choice-based assessments do not follow the usual test scripts. 
Like all interactive interfaces, they need user testing to ensure 
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that learners understand what they are doing. As good as one’s 
theory might be, there are still a thousand nooks and crannies 
of decision making that hide beneath the smooth surface of the 
theory. Designers need empirical data to refine their designs, 
and for assessment, this means having as many people using 
the assessment as possible. Enter crowdsourcing.
Crowdsourcing uses massive human power to find novel 
solutions to complex problems. A well-known example is Wiki-
pedia, which relies on crowds to write and monitor its encyclo-
pedia entries. Yelp! counts on many people to review service 
providers such as restaurants, painters, and plumbers. Foldit 
has enlisted hundreds of thousands of players to fold proteins 
in a spatial game format. The crowd of players has solved biol-
ogy problems that have defied the computational capabilities of 
computers and lone scientists (Cooper et al. 2010).
More relevant for our purposes are crowdsourcing approaches 
such as Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk. MTurk.com is a Web 
site on which requesters post tasks for workers to perform for pay. 
These tasks are often trivial, with correspondingly small pay. 
For example, workers might be asked to decide whether a word 
makes them happy or sad, and be paid one penny. More involved 
tasks need not pay well. Some tasks take up to thirty minutes 
and pay only fifty cents, but over 16 percent of the workers will 
still complete such tasks at such pay rates (Buhrmester, Kwang, 
and Gosling 2011). And workers are plentiful.
For our vision of choice-based assessments, we imagine 
crowdsourcing assessments for large numbers of children in 
school classrooms, afterschool programs, museums, or at home 
for fun. This is one reason that Planet OhNo! takes the form of 
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a game. Rather than paying people to use the assessments, we 
want people to choose to take them. (Plus, why do tests have 
to be so serious anyway?) If children want to take the assess-
ments, we can use kidsourcing to refine and validate them (the 
assessments, not the kids). Kidsourcing would provide massive 
amounts of user data, which could then serve as the fodder for 
refinement and data-mining analyses that would inform further 
development and rapid iteration.
A helpful technique for kidsourcing is called A-B testing. It 
is a method of crowdsourcing used by online companies to 
make small changes to features of their products. For example, 
Amazon.com (a company that clearly has its act together with 
respect to data analysis) might show a million customers a page 
for a certain item. For half of them, the page shows a red button, 
and for the other half, the page shows a green button. If more 
customers who see the green button buy the item, Amazon 
learns that the green button configuration is more effec-
tive. Closer to education, Refraction (http://www.kongregate 
.com/games/GameScience/refraction) is a novel, game-based 
approach to designing an optimal learning sequence for frac-
tions. By using A-B testing, the Refraction system can learn the 
optimal sequencing of the curriculum. After completing prob-
lem-type A, for instance, half the students can be sent to prob-
lem-set B, while the other half works on problem-set C. Then 
both groups of students work on problem set D. If the students 
who completed the A-B sequence do better on D than those 
who completed the A-C sequence, then there is evidence that 
the A-B sequence is superior to the A-C one. In the context of 
designing novel assessment formats, A-B testing would provide 
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a way to find the most effective presentation of the materials 
before using the assessments for their intended purpose. (We 
say more about this below.)
Before moving on, we want to press the point for how impor-
tant crowdsourcing could be for advances in the learning sci-
ences and assessments. The number of learning studies that fail 
because of unvetted measures is extremely high. Researchers 
might include a series of questions that are too easy or too hard, 
so they cannot detect the effect of an instructional treatment. 
Or the test instructions may include a phrase that participants 
interpret in unintended ways, so they are actually answer-
ing a different question. We once asked a physicist to estimate 
how he spent his time when doing research studies (Schwartz, 
Martin, and Chang 2008). He said that 95 percent of his time 
creating experiments was spent on the measurements. In educa-
tion schools as well as government organizations there has been 
a great deal of discussion about the importance of randomized 
clinical trials along with other logical and statistical aspects of 
research design. This discussion misses the true bottleneck in 
research. Though we do not have hard evidence, we are con-
vinced that many more studies of learning fail because of bad 
measures than because of unanticipated confounds. To avoid 
the risk of failure, researchers frequently design well-controlled 
studies that use routine (“safe”) measures that continue to mea-
sure the wrong outcomes. Crowdsourcing could help alleviate 
some of the risks of innovating new choice-based measures, 
because researchers could try out their measures beforehand. 
If successful, crowdsourcing could enable a new generation of 
research on learning outcomes.
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Validating Assessments
In the normative world of education, we care about “better” 
and “worse,” so it is crucial to make warrants that a particular 
performance is  “better.” Knowledge-based assessments rely 
on objective “right” and “wrong” answers as their criteria for 
better and worse. Few would argue with the claim that “five” 
is a worse answer than “four” to the question, “What is two 
plus two?” But with choices, people may reasonably challenge 
whether one choice is better than another. Who is to say that 
persisting is better than not? Here we present some approaches 
to validating whether some choices are better or worse. As 
always, our criteria of better and worse are with respect to learn-
ing. We begin with the correlational approach that we used for 
the choicelet described in chapter 2 (Ohno! Has Talent). Then 
we describe an experimental approach and conclude with ways 
to use crowdsourcing.
The top panel of figure 10.2 shows the approach we took for 
Ohno! Has Talent. In this game, students had to make choices 
about how to learn so they could solve a series of puzzles about 
mixing light beams to make different colors. The analysis 
approach depended on individual differences among children 
and the correlations of those differences with other measures. 
We found that individual differences in the way students made 
choices in Ohno! Has Talent predicted about 35 percent of the 
differences in math class performance among students. Specif-
ically, students who spent time trying to figure out which of 
several color charts was correct were also doing better in math-
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The solid lines indicate evidence that connects choices to standard 
learning outcomes (correct answers), whereas the dotted lines indicate 
evidence that connects choices during the assessment to choice-based 
outcomes.
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the top figure. It provides initial support for the claim that cer-
tain choices—in this case, the choice to decide which chart to 
believe—are better for learning. 
We can further tighten this line of evidence. For example, 
the third level of Ohno! Has Talent can also be analyzed in figure 
10.2 as a posttest for level 2. If students make good learning 
choices on level 2 and learn about additive color, then they 
should do well on level 3. It turns out that the same choice pat-
tern in level 2 that predicted learning in students’ math class 
also predicted performance on level 3. Children who chose to 
evaluate color charts did better on the problems on level 3. This 
is arc c, and it offers a second line of evidence that the choice 
to engage in critical thinking is a good learning choice. Finally, 
we found that student performance on level 3 of the game cor-
related with how well students were doing in their math class. 
This is arc a. 
In summary, choices in the game predicted children’s class-
room performance measured by knowledge tests and how well 
students learned color mixing based on a knowledge assessment 
embedded as part of the game. The knowledge-based assessment 
within the third level of Ohno! Has Talent also correlated with 
school performance. This provides a good start in showing that 
choosing to spend time on deciding what to believe is a good 
learning choice.
These first three lines of evidence connect choices to stan-
dard knowledge-based measures, which is important for con-
vincing those who still think knowledge-based assessments are 
the ground truth for evaluating learning. Our interest goes fur-
ther, however, as represented by the dotted lines in figure 10.2. 
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These lines represent possible evidence that learning choices 
during the game predict other learning choices. For this line of 
evidence, it is essential to connect choices within the game to 
those that occur in other contexts, such as a classroom or infor-
mal learning settings.
The results from Ohno! Has Talent supplied a further level of 
detail that could be useful in this regard. There were two dom-
inant patterns of choices in this game. One pattern occurred 
when students chose to figure out which of the color charts is 
correct. This predicted better performance in math class. The 
other pattern happened when students used the experiment 
room to solve the problems. These students would mix colors in 
the experiment room to determine which colors to mix for the 
gameplay. Once they found the answer in the experiment room, 
they would choose the corresponding color on the game board 
and mix the right colors. This choice pattern predicted poor per-
formance in math class (r2 = -0.15), even though it was success-
ful in the game. Our speculation is that students who pursued 
this latter choice pattern had learned to solve problems one at a 
time rather than trying to find the general explanation. In math 
class, one can imagine students working to get the right answer 
for each separate math problem without attempting to find the 
deeper explanation that handles all possible related problems. 
The students who spent their time trying to decide which color 
chart to believe, on the other hand, were trying to find the gen-
eral framework that could handle any colors in the game. 
Given this more refined analysis, we can begin to imagine 
what types of learning choices we would look for in classrooms. 
In a situation of collaborative learning, for instance, we might 
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expect the students who solved the problems one at a time to 
simply ask for the right answer to math problems. In contrast, 
children who evaluated the catalogs might be expected to spend 
more time evaluating the rationale of their collaborator’s solu-
tions to determine whether to believe them.
We also found evidence tying good choices within the game 
(arc 3). Choices in the first levels of the game predicted the 
choices that students made in the last level of the game. Alas, 
we have not yet looked at math class choices outside the game, 
so we do not have evidence one way or another regarding arcs 
1 and 2. Of course, few assessments achieve the level of ground 
truth validation where performance on a test is directly cor-
related to learning behaviors and experiences in school. Most 
assessments instead assume that students have been exposed to 
the content in the classroom. The exposure is taken as a con-
stant, and therefore, the inference is that the assessment is mea-
suring the ground truth of what children should have learned.
More generally, a correlation approach is not ideally suited to 
finding how the choices in a choicelet manifest themselves in 
the world beyond. This is because it would be too inefficient to 
search across hours of observations to find, catalog, and count 
choices that might correlate with the choice behaviors in the 
choicelet. The experimental approach in the middle panel of 
figure 10.1 (plate 4) is a more tractable methodology.
In the experimental model, there would typically be an inter-
vention where different groups of students are led to make dif-
ferent choices during learning. For example, imagine math class 
X learns to use a specific mathematical formula by evaluating 
which company is telling the truth in its advertising. Math class 
140 Chapter 10
Y learns the same mathematical formula, and then is asked to 
use it to compute the values for a set of companies, but with-
out the cover story of evaluating which companies are telling 
the truth. Sometime afterward, the students from both groups 
complete Ohno! Has Talent. It seems unlikely they would trans-
fer knowledge of the math formula to help solve this particu-
lar game. So in this case, one would predict that neither class 
would show a knowledge arc from the classroom to the assess-
ment. (To achieve this arc, instruction would have to be rele-
vant to color.) On the other hand, one might anticipate that 
class X would be more likely to choose to apply critical think-
ing to the color charts in the catalog, whereas class Y would be 
less likely to do so. If true, this would help make a tight connec-
tion between the learning experiences in the classroom and the 
choices made in the assessment. Moreover, students who choose 
to evaluate the color charts should learn more from Ohno! Has 
Talent, as measured by the arcs into level 3 of the game. This 
overall pattern of evidence would indicate that learning to eval-
uate in school improves students’ choices and learning as mea-
sured by the assessment. A similar logic can be used to evaluate 
informal learning experiences, for example, to determine if vis-
iting a museum or completing an outdoor camp subsequently 
leads to different choices and learning compared to not visiting 
the exhibit or completing the camp.
This experimental model is the standard approach when eval-
uating whether some form of instruction (whether about choices 
or not) is better or worse than another one. It neatly comple-
ments our overall interest in using assessments to sort learning 
experiences rather than sorting students. The result of this type 
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of research can indicate which form of instruction is better as 
well as when a specific pattern of choice leads to better learning.
The kidsourcing model shown in the bottom panel of 
figure 10.2 is a hybrid of the experimental and correlational 
approaches. It provides a way to validate that some choices 
are better than others for learning, even when it is impossi-
ble to find out who the test takers are in the “real world.” One 
approach involves a two-step process. The first step is experi-
mental. It uses A-B testing. The kidsourcers log into the game 
and receive one of two variations of the choicelet. Each varia-
tion “induces” learners into different patterns of choice, perhaps 
through the manipulation of points or entertainment value. 
For instance, with Ohno! Has Talent, students may be induced 
to use the experiment room by making use of the chart cata-
log cost points, and vice versa for inducing students to use the 
chart catalog. After confirming that students made the antici-
pated choices in their respective versions, it is then possible to 
see which students learned about color better. If the students 
who used the chart catalog did better, then there would be a 
warrant that this is a better choice pattern.
The second step involves the correlational model. New stu-
dents use the same choicelet without any inducements. If the 
assessment is working, students who choose to evaluate the 
catalog chart should learn more than students who do not do 
so. Because the experimental approach showed a direct connec-
tion between the choices and learning, the correlational results 
are less prone to arguments that there is no causal relation 
between the choices and the learning. Thus, even though we 
do not know much about the kidsourcers, it is still possible to 
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use them to help design assessments. Once the assessment has 
been developed, it can then be deployed in more typical mea-
surement scenarios such as comparing two forms of instruction.
A second example may be useful. Steven Dow and his col-
leagues (2010) did an experiment with undergraduates on design 
skills. There were two conditions in this study: serial and parallel 
design. Students in the serial condition were induced to design 
a Web advertisement for a magazine by repeating five design-
feedback cycles. They created a design and received generic 
feedback (“good design uses color well”), then had an opportu-
nity to create their next design, and so on. After their iterations, 
they created their final advertisement. In the parallel condition, 
students were induced to design three advertisements first and 
then got generic feedback on the trio. The students then pro-
duced two advertisements and got feedback, and then the final 
advertisement. In both conditions, the feedback was generic as 
opposed to specific to their designs, and both designed a total 
of six advertisements, so the main difference was whether they 
produced their first few advertisements serially or in parallel. 
The results demonstrated that students in the parallel condi-
tion produced better advertisements. One measurement asked 
experts to rate the advertisements, and on average, they rated 
the parallel condition ads as more creative and effective. The 
second measure is a more interesting assessment.
In a rare opportunity for ground truthing an assessment, the 
researchers posted the participants’ advertisements online, so 
that different casual users of the Web would see different ver-
sions. For example, one segment of Web users got to see the 
advertisement from one participant, while another segment 
got to see the ad from a different participant. Using Google 
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analytics, the researchers tracked how often casual Web brows-
ers clicked on each advertisement to actually go to the maga-
zine’s Web site. By the end of fourteen days, over one million 
people had seen an advertisement designed by the participants 
in the study. As it turned out, the ads from the students in the 
parallel condition received more “click-through” to the mag-
azine’s home page. The researchers thus were able to test the 
ground truth of parallel versus serial design choices by seeing 
which of the resulting advertisements were actually more effec-
tive. Hearteningly, the crowd and the expert evaluation reached 
the same conclusion.
This design study gathered evidence that the parallel pat-
tern of choices is better for learning to make a good advertise-
ment. (When people design serially, they tend to refine one 
idea. When people design multiple versions in parallel, they are 
more likely to explore the creative possibilities before refining.) 
The next step, which has not been completed, is to conduct the 
individual-differences (correlational) phase, in which students 
would complete the design task without any inducements, so 
the assessment evaluates their design-feedback choices. Do they 
choose serial feedback or the more effective parallel approach? 
In terms of building evidence for the “betterness” of the par-
allel choice, people who choose the parallel approach should 
also exhibit better advertisements on average, as evaluated by 
experts or click-through rates when posted on the Internet.
Choice-Adaptive Instruction
Perhaps the best validation of an assessment would be to show 
that it provides actionable information that improves learning. 
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If an assessment helps improve learning, then we know the 
assessment is measuring something useful and in a useful way. 
People do try to use assessment information to improve learn-
ing—for example, by holding school financing decisions and 
employees accountable to the assessment. But this produces 
an indirect connection between an assessment and improving 
learning; it is hard to use the effects of financing decisions as 
evidence regarding the quality of the assessment itself. A more 
direct approach is to match the precision of the assessment to 
precise changes in learning. If an assessment supplies feedback 
that a student is making poor choices, and it also includes suc-
cessful provisions for improving those choices, then it gains a 
tremendous amount of credibility.
In a computer learning environment, an ideal choice-based 
assessment would adapt to the choices the students make, so 
it would support their abilities to make better choices. We will 
call this a choice-adaptive learning environment. The term 
adaptive, as used here, does not refer to current versions of com-
puter-adaptive testing. In computer-adaptive testing, the term 
adaptive indicates the ability of the computer to efficiently 
hone in on a student’s level of knowledge by constantly recali-
brating question difficulty based on the student’s performance 
so far. Computer-adaptive testing is about shortening overall 
test-taking time. A choice-adaptive environment instead adapts 
to students’ choices to help guide them to better ones. Instruc-
tion and assessment would be seamlessly coupled, providing 
important guidance to learners, educators, and policymakers.
To develop a choice-adaptive environment will require a new 
class of behavioral research. There are already computer science 
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techniques for creating intelligent environments that adapt to 
learners (e.g., Koedinger and Anderson 1997). What is missing, 
besides new types of assessments, is research on how to effec-
tively guide learning choices. For instance, if an intelligent com-
puter system detects that students are making a poor pattern of 
choices, what should it do to guide the students to make better 
choices? Perhaps it should force the learners to make better 
choices by turning off all the other choices. Maybe it should 
simply tell the learners the preferred choices. It could incen-
tivize the better choices with points. It could tell the students 
that other people using the system are making different choices 
that seem to be working. All of these would likely work to some 
degree. What we do not know is whether the choice pattern the 
students are “encouraged” to use would transfer. For example, 
turning off all the bad choice alternatives would ensure that stu-
dents make the right choices within the system, but it is not 
obvious that they would then make the good choices when 
they return to a world with many choices available. Except for 
a few instances (e.g., the study by Jeong and colleagues [2008] 
using HMM described at the end of chapter 8), researchers have 
not looked at a choice as an outcome, and therefore, we do not 
know how to help students learn to make good choices.
Summary
This chapter proposed several practical and methodological 
ideas for how to move forward in making as well as validat-
ing new forms of assessments. Many of the precise concerns 
of psychometrics have been set aside. Our proposal is that new 
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technological possibilities have created a time when it is better 
to support proliferation. Pruning to technical specifications can 
occur later through a process of continual improvement. Our 
generate-and-test proposal is different from current models of 
assessment development, which seem to be more committed 
to cultivating a perfect flower that is like all other flowers, but 
maybe a little more resilient.
V The End Matters

11 Fairness and Choice
Assessment is inextricably linked to questions of fairness. 
Three outstanding issues are the content of the assessment, the 
use of the results, and respect for the persons being assessed. 
Regarding the content of an assessment, educational assessment 
entails a commitment to elevating some aspects of experi-
ence and individuals over others. This in turn raises questions 
of what measures are fair to include or exclude. As a concrete 
example, one of us (Schwartz) taught in a remote little Alaskan 
village for many years (remote, that is, from the vantage point 
of city dwellers). The village did not have radio or television; 
it was also five hundred air miles from the nearest road. One 
year, the students received a reading test that used the word 
curb. The village had no curbs, and most of the students had 
never seen one. On that item, they surely did poorly compared 
to city dwellers. This example fits into a larger discussion about 
whether assessments should take into account students’ oppor-
tunity to learn (Moss et al. 2008) or should be treated more like 
driving tests, where the public only cares whether a person is 
competent to a standard.
In addition to questions about what gets measured, the fair-
ness of a test involves the way it is put to use. For example, 
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in this particular Alaskan school, the lack of item fairness did 
not really matter, because the principal (not from the village) 
liked to change student answers. Sitting in his office, he would 
erase student answers on the bubble forms and insert his own. 
While this behavior seems perverse, it was his way of putting 
the assessment to fair use. He made it so that half the stu-
dents would do so poorly that they would receive federal fund-
ing for special needs, and the other half would do so well that 
they would also receive federal funding for being gifted and 
talented. (No average students at this school!) He thought this 
was fair, because these students lived in a village that needed 
more resources to achieve educational equality. While extreme, 
the example highlights that the best attempts to build fairness 
into a test are prone to distortion. People will always work to 
find advantage when an assessment has material consequences. 
They may teach to the test, or as in this case, cheat to the test.
Finally, the administration of assessments needs to be fair in 
the way it respects those people who are taking the test. In the 
case of the Alaskan school, the doctored tests led many students 
to be labeled as learning disabled. While this may have been fair 
at the level of bringing more funds to the school and compen-
sating for unfair test content, it was unfair to these students. 
Respect for persons is typically handled through some form of 
informed consent to ensure that people know what they are get-
ting into when they agree to take an assessment.
Choice-based assessments make it more difficult to hide 
from questions of fairness. If we assess people’s choices, then we 
are making a claim that students should make certain choices. 
Knowledge-based assessments feel safer. Knowledge can be 
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conceptualized as an enabler. Knowledge is an engine of human 
performance, but it is still up to the driver to choose where to 
steer the car. With choices, we are telling people where they 
should steer their cars. Choice-based assessments go beyond mea-
suring enablement to measuring action itself. This potentially 
intrudes on personal freedom, because people should be allowed 
to steer their own car. Of course, knowledge-based assessments 
also steer the car (as we will discuss below). But choice makes 
the intrusion more salient. This elevation of ethical concern is 
notable, since it shows that choices are closer to what people care 
about and therefore what we should be assessing.
We examine the three fairness issues in turn: the selection of 
what choices to evaluate, the use of assessments to enforce pat-
terns of choice, and respect for those who take the tests. Again, 
we do not believe these fairness issues are unique to choice-
based assessments, but choice makes them more apparent. Our 
goal is to raise these issues and some of their dimensions. Read-
ers should not read this chapter if they are expecting answers. If 
readers plan to create or deploy assessments, though, it is useful 
to explore the ethical dimensions of the endeavor.
Deciding Which Choices to Assess
When measuring students’ knowledge, there is a belief that 
the knowledge is objective. Here, we do not mean an objective 
measure of how much knowledge the student has but rather the 
notion of objective knowledge. For example, knowledge that 
the earth orbits the sun is taken as objective. Whether or not 
it is true, the knowledge is so broadly shared and accepted that 
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it is understood as objective. Disciplines have well-established 
criteria for what comprises the knowledge in their field. Choice 
is another matter.
Choice is manifestly a social construction. What constitutes 
a choice for one person may not be a choice for another. Hazel 
Markus (personal communication) described a study where the 
participants were led to the door of a room in which they were 
to fill out a short survey. The room had five substations, in each 
of which were five colored pencils, five sheets of paper that held 
the same questionnaire, and five candies. Once the participants 
were done, the experimenter asked how many choices they had 
made. East Indians said they made about one or two choices 
(choosing among colored pencils was not really a choice). Amer-
icans on average said they made four. One woman said she had 
made nine choices. For instance, she had picked up one of the 
candies, set it down on second thought, and picked up another 
candy; to her, this constituted three separate choices.
This raises the question of what choices to elevate into “real 
choices” through assessments. We probably do not want to 
make all possible choices meaningful. As Barry Schwartz (2004) 
demonstrated, too many choices can cause people unhappiness, 
especially if the individuals are perfectionists. At the same time, 
people can benefit from learning about choices they never knew 
were available as well as their mostly likely outcomes.
The social construction of choice raises issues of fairness. If 
some choices are not recognized by a segment of the popula-
tion, do we have the right to make those choices central to their 
education, and if we do, will we intrude on other choices they 
value more? We confront a similar problem when deciding what 
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“knowledge” to include in a history curriculum. Should a treat-
ment of the United States, say, include the Anglo-Saxon version 
of America, the Native American version, the African-American 
version, or perhaps the Soviet one? Notably, these types of issues 
do not show up much in science or mathematics curricula (e.g., 
Should we teach intelligent design?). With the introduction of 
choice as an outcome, educators in the science, technology, engi-
neering, and mathematics disciplines would no longer be falsely 
protected from these normative questions by believing that what-
ever they teach is safely objective. If they were teaching choices, 
then they could not ignore the socially constructed reality of edu-
cational outcomes. They would have to consider whether asking 
students to develop interest and persistence has equal standing 
to learning the objectively known quadratic equation.
How might we decide what choices to emphasize while mini-
mizing the potential for unfairness? It is important to remem-
ber that the choices we care about are learning-relevant ones; 
not all choices are diagnostic from the perspective of learning. A 
useful first step is to take an empirical approach. Here, the goal 
would be to determine which choices have the largest influ-
ence on learning. If we were to analyze the log file of a student 
using Ohno! Has Talent, for example, the choice of where to let 
the cursor rest while thinking is less relevant than the choice 
of whether to open up one of the color charts. A data-driven 
answer would help alleviate some of the problems associated 
with the social construction of what constitutes a useful choice, 
at least with respect to learning. People would then be able to 
debate whether the learning value of a choice is high enough 
that it is worth favoring in assessment.
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A complementary approach is to look for a set of learning 
choices that most people would accept, if they understood the 
underlying rationale. Jim Greeno (forthcoming) has taken this 
approach by reviewing work on intellectual virtues. He high-
lights that elements of moral behavior can be found in intel-
lectual pursuits: patience, open-mindedness, responsibility, the 
fair evaluation of arguments, and so on. A rational analysis of 
such intellectual virtues could provide a high-level framework 
for making decisions about which choices fall within the pur-
view of the intellectual pursuit of education. Assertions about 
the appropriateness of measuring one choice or another could 
be made by reference to a constitution of intellectual virtues. 
(No doubt, there would also need to be a bill of rights.)
The Use of Assessments to Enforce Choices
Our hope is that choice-based assessments can be used to help 
students develop good learning choices that will serve their 
interests well. The logic is that if assessments focus on choices, 
then instruction will try to instill those choices. This raises the 
unhappy paradox that to help students learn to choose for 
themselves, it may be necessary to shape their choices, which 
would mean they were never “really” choosing.
Eamonn Callan (2009) describes a version of the paradox in 
his essay on choosing to be Catholic. The dilemma is that deep 
Catholic faith requires that one choose to be a Catholic, but the 
only way one can truly choose Catholicism is if one has suffi-
cient knowledge to understand what is being chosen. The ques-
tion is: Should parents deny their children the choice of not 
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being Catholic when they are young, so that the children can 
gain the requisite knowledge for a future free choice on becom-
ing Catholic? These are deep theoretical waters. Of course, 
choice-based assessments are not the only educational endeav-
ors that float on them. Education is normative, and forces larger 
than the learner conspire to deem what is worth learning—
whether this involves knowledge or choice.
One way to try to address the paradox is to make it into an 
instructional question. Perhaps there is a way to make instruc-
tion where students have the opportunity to make decisions 
freely, and then they can experience the consequences. They 
thus can judge whether they like those consequences, which 
would help them learn about the value of different types of 
choices. This is a good approach to learning, because experienc-
ing the results of one’s choices is an excellent way to learn. Edu-
cation can provide a protected environment to ensure that the 
choices do not have catastrophic outcomes—a choice sandbox 
in which students can learn about different choices and their 
effects. This does not skirt the paradox of enforcing choices, as 
we will explain next, but it may provide a useful compromise. 
Providing students with the belief they are making a choice 
does not skirt the paradox because the outcomes of those 
choices and how those outcomes shape future choices are 
still enforced by authority. In educational settings, the conse-
quences of making a given choice are largely orchestrated by 
that setting. This is how educational settings can create a pro-
tected learning environment: by controlling the consequences 
attached to different choices. This orchestration also makes it so 
that some choices are better than others. So while children may 
156 Chapter 11
believe they have agency in the choices they make, forces out-
side their control are still shaping them—forces that educators 
have explicitly or implicitly designed.
B. F. Skinner (1986), a US behaviorist, famously proposed that 
education should unambiguously shape student behavior by 
establishing clear reinforcement contingencies for those things 
that need to be taught. School is not life, he contended. After 
school, students can choose—or more properly, believe they 
choose—whatever actions they would like. Skinner’s arguments 
are compelling, although the science behind them has been 
superseded by new findings and theories. But at a higher level, 
Skinner missed something fundamental. The narrative of choice 
and agency is basic to contemporary discourse and people’s self-
conception (Bandura 1989). Whether or not the narrative is cor-
rect, agency is a socially constructed reality, and our civil society 
depends on it. Students need to experience and reflect on the 
agency of choice, even if they are guided toward some choices 
over others. So whether or not one likes the idea of providing 
“faux” choices for students, it is important for them to experi-
ence choice making. In Callan’s paradox, we would be satisfied 
if children had a chance to entertain the possibility of not being 
Catholic, even if that was not really an option until they were 
older. If the goal is to prepare people to choose, then the exis-
tence of choices needs to suffuse learning.
Respect for People’s Right to Choose
By collecting student choices, we are looking for patterns that 
tell us about learners and their learning experiences. To what 
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extent should the learners (and their parents) have the right to 
choose to participate, and to what degree do they need to know 
the details of what they are choosing and how their results will 
be used?
In the conduct of federally funded research, the rules for 
respecting people’s rights are enforced. To experiment or gather 
data on human behavior, researchers need to submit their 
research protocol to a local institutional review board. This 
board is entrusted with protecting the rights of human subjects, 
and it is under the broader regulation of a federal body. In addi-
tion to questions of risk and confidentiality, a major compo-
nent of any review is whether and how the participants give 
informed consent. Informed consent means that the partici-
pants understand what they are agreeing to with respect to both 
the experience itself and the potential uses of their data. There 
are conditions under which informed consent is not required, 
but a lack of transparency needs to be well justified and pose 
minimal risk to the participants.
Oftentimes, decisions about informed consent intersect with 
practical considerations. School districts in California use pas-
sive consent to administer assessments. Passive consent means 
that parents do not have to give their approval for their chil-
dren to take a test, but the parents can always withdraw their 
implied consent if they do not want their children to be tested. 
The schools do not work hard to inform parents that they can 
withdraw their consent. One practical reason is that absentee 
students are counted as “fails” in the school’s overall score. 
Children who do not take the tests lower the standing of the 
school. 
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This seems like a bizarre policy for evaluating a school—pun-
ishing the school for families who choose against a test. Yet the 
scoring policy has a history. Before the policy, some schools 
were asking their least capable students to stay home, so they 
would not take the test. This way, the low-achieving students 
would not bring down the average of the school. The absentee 
policy of counting missing students as fails was put in place to 
stop schools from doing this. With the new policy, schools do 
not broadly publicize that students are not compelled to take 
high-stakes tests, because students who do not take the test 
necessarily reduce the school average. Practical considerations 
have trumped the subtleties of informed consent. It is notable 
that this example is eerily close to that of the Alaskan principal, 
who simply changed answers to gain material advantage for his 
school. When there are material consequences, people will fre-
quently interpret what fair means in self-serving ways.
Because assessments cannot guarantee they are fair, informed 
consent becomes especially significant when assessment data 
are used to make decisions about future opportunities and other 
material impacts. The people who have the strongest claim to 
informed consent are those who will be affected. When the 
assessments are being used to evaluate learning experiences, as 
we advocated earlier, then it is not clear where to get informed 
consent. One answer is that if the assessments are being used 
to evaluate the educators who create the learning experiences, 
then respect for the educators would dictate that they under-
stand what is going on and the possible uses of the data. Of 
course, the fact that educators are informed does not mean 
that their consent is voluntary. The consent could be a tacit (or 
explicit) element of their employment.
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A less pressing aspect of informed consent, at least in our 
opinion, involves letting students know that they are taking an 
assessment. In our Ohno! Has Talent example, students thought 
they were playing a game. They thought the goal was to level 
up in a game about mixing colors. They did not know that 
our intent for the game was to measure their learning choices 
involving critical thinking. At the time, it never occurred to us 
to tell them. Is this fair? Our current thinking, as unsatisfying as 
it will be, is that the demands of transparency can be mitigated 
by practical concerns, assuming there is minimal risk or conse-
quence to those being assessed.
Some researchers have advocated “stealth” assessments, 
where students do not know they are being tested (Shute 2011). 
One benefit of stealth assessments is that they can be ongoing 
rather than highly marked events. With an assessment, we usu-
ally want to know a learner’s typical performance—what they 
are choosing most of the time. Thus, ongoing measurement 
provides a sufficient sample to determine typical choice 
behaviors.
In contrast, when students know they are being tested, they 
often strive for maximal performance. For instance, students 
complete test preparation classes so they can do well on admis-
sions tests. The assessment in this case is not measuring what 
learners are typically like but instead what the learners are like 
when giving maximal effort (which they may or may not do 
most other times). Moreover, the assessments end up favoring 
those who have the resources to take test preparation classes 
to enhance their maximal performance, while measuring the 
typical performances of those who do not attend such courses. 
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Transparency thus can make it difficult to interpret test results, 
and in the case of high-stakes tests, it can actually make tests 
less fair by one interpretation.
Transparency also leads to “gaming” a test. Students put 
in maximal effort to learn how to pass a test without actually 
learning the content in any deep way. We think choice-based 
assessments can avoid some of the gaming problem, because 
students need to learn during the test. If they gamed the test by 
learning about which choices help them learn, that would be 
an excellent outcome. But one can imagine that students might 
instead learn that they should make certain choices to do well 
on the test and not learn anything. So a lack of transparency, 
at least about specific test items, seems warranted, though we 
imagine that there are those who will disagree by claiming stu-
dents have a right to know exactly what will be on the test and 
when the test is being given.
Summary
People have a natural tendency toward wishful thinking. 
Wishful thinking about assessments—that they are impartial 
measures, much like a yardstick is an impartial measure of 
height—lets people avoid the clutter of ethical questions and 
treat assessments as objective measures. But the truth is that 
an educational assessment is not a yardstick. It does not simply 
measure a learning outcome. Assessment elevates some aspects 
of experience over others, and it actively shapes what people 
consider important. Assessments do not merely test reality; they 
also create it.
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Assessments are intended to help students, educators, par-
ents, institutions, and policymakers formulate decisions with 
consequences as well. In combination, the reality- and decision-
making aspects of assessment raise issues of fairness about an 
assessment’s content and use. On the assumption that norma-
tive assessments can never be fully fair, assessments also raise 
questions about the degree to which test takers need to under-
stand these matters before consenting to be tested. These are 
difficult questions, and our goal is not to reach answers. Rather, 
our aim is to help people avoid wishful thinking, so that those 




A wry professor of clinical psychology once told us, “I do 
diagnosis, not treatment.” Her research involved defining 
clinical levels of psychological dysfunctions and tracking down 
their etiology. She did not study how to fix the dysfunction. 
She saw herself as a basic scientist, not an applied one. Often-
times, assessment work has the same characteristic, where the 
accepted goal is to diagnose (or characterize) learners. It is up 
to other people to figure out what to do, whoever those other 
people might be. This misses the basic fact that educational 
assessment is applied work from the outset.
The purpose of assessment is normative. The goal is to 
improve, not prove. For the professor, if two measures yielded 
the same diagnosis at the same cost, it would be silly to ask 
whether one is preferable. In education, the same logic does 
not apply, because assessments are not passive measures. They 
shape what people believe is useful and therefore influence the 
actions that individuals and governments undertake. If measur-
ing breath-holding capacity worked better than the SAT for pre-
dicting college success, it would still be a mistake to use breath 
holding as an assessment. Test preparation programs would 
focus on the ability to hold one’s breath. Assessments have 
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social consequences, and as such, the design of assessment goes 
beyond pure scientific measurement.
For many, assessments are a lighthouse in the fog of educa-
tion—a clear guide by which to make safe decisions. But in real-
ity, assessments create the fog. Current assessments perpetuate 
beliefs that the proper outcomes of learning are static facts and 
routine skills—stuff that is easy to score as right or wrong. Inter-
est, curiosity, identification, self-efficacy, belonging, and all the 
other goals of informal learning cannot even sit at the assess-
ment table, because these outcomes are too far removed from 
current beliefs about what is really important. Assessments seem 
to be built on the presupposition that people will never need to 
learn anything new after the test, because current assessments 
miss so many aspects of what it means to be prepared for future 
learning. These frozen-moment assessments have influenced 
what people think counts as useful learning, which then shows 
up in curricula, standards, instructional technologies, and peo-
ple’s pursuits.
If the fog were lifted, we would see that most of the stake-
holders in education care first and foremost about people’s abil-
ities to make good choices. Making good choices depends on 
what people know, but it also depends on much more, includ-
ing interest, persistence, and a host of twenty-first-century soft 
skills that are critical to learning. Where we can anticipate a 
stable future—decoding letters into words is likely to be a stable 
demand for the next fifty years—then knowledge- and skill-
based assessments make sense. In relation to those aspects of the 
future that are less stable, though, people will need to choose 
whether, what, when, and how to learn. Hence, it is important 
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to focus on choices that influence learning, and assessments 
should measure those choices. Choice is the critical outcome of 
learning, not knowledge. Knowledge is an enabler; choice is the 
outcome.
Assessing choices during learning has a number of attrac-
tive properties. Foremost, choice-based assessments are process 
oriented. They examine learning choices in action rather than 
only the end products. This process focus makes it possible to 
connect the learning behaviors during the assessment to pro-
cesses that occur in a learning environment. Second, the assess-
ments reveal what students are prepared to learn, so they are 
prospective as opposed to retrospective. Third, choice resonates 
with the rest of the social sciences that examine the move-
ments of people, money, and ideas. Fourth, choices do not lend 
themselves to simplistic reifications whereby things like peo-
ple’s knowledge or personality traits are misinterpreted as inde-
pendent of context and immune to change. Fifth, choices can 
measure a much greater range of learning outcomes than fact 
retrieval and procedural application. We have demonstrated 
several, including persistence after failure, critical thinking, 
attending to some ideas over others, creating a general solution, 
creative design, reading to learn, use of help, inductive strate-
gies, and the uptake of feedback. There are many more to be 
had. Sixth, learning choices are a good candidate for inclusion 
in standards, which currently define what knowledge students 
should have but stay strangely silent about the processes of 
learning themselves.
Recent advancements in technology create a special oppor-
tunity for moving toward a new paradigm of assessment. There 
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are risks, however. People may only use technology to make 
us faster and more entrenched at doing the wrong thing. If 
used well, technology makes it possible to create and validate 
choice-based assessments by using the rapid generation of inter-
active environments, crowdsourcing, automated logging, and 
data mining. To create choice-based assessments, we have pro-
posed a strategy that puts assessment development in the hands 
of many in a process of continual improvement. Rather than 
assuming there is a dark priesthood of assessment makers who 
pray at the altar of psychometrics, we have suggested democ-
ratizing assessment design to generate as many instances as 
possible. We should prune after, not before, the assessments 
are created. High variability is the route to innovation; a press 
toward efficiency is not.
We have described one possible approach to support rapid 
development with the example of Planet OhNo!—an example 
that included resources for designing and evaluating candidate 
assessments. We have also offered a number of methodological 
strategies for helping people determine whether they are iden-
tifying choices that are better or worse. Most notably, we advo-
cated assessment approaches that work to evaluate learning 
experiences. This changes the focus of assessments. Instead of 
making a scientific diagnosis of an individual, for which there 
may or may not be a treatment, we have proposed diagnosing 
the learning experiences themselves, because this is what needs 
to change for broad-scale improvements in learning.
We have concluded with a reminder that the assessment 
enterprise must be constantly attentive to questions of fair-
ness. Because assessment is normative, it raises issues of fairness 
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that science normally does not. Choice-based assessments bring 
these fairness considerations into strong relief because they 
explicitly favor some choices over others. In this regard, choice-
based assessments make us squeamish. It would be easier to hide 
behind the idea that we are teaching students the truth and 
innocently measuring whether they have learned it. The quea-
siness we feel about making decisions regarding which choices 
are better and worse indicates that we are getting closer to the 
proper concerns of education.

Notes
1. The mystery operator is a form of modular multiplication, with P as 
1, Q as 2, and so on. P is thus the “identity” element: P crossed with any 
letter yields that letter. R crossed with a letter yields “three times” that 
letter in modular or “clock” counting; for example, R crossed with Q 
yields Q, because Q is 2 and R is 3, and 3 × 2 = 6, and 6 mod 4 = 2, which 
is Q.
2. It is possible that the graduate students had a propensity to create 
visual representations of data prior to graduate school, in which case 
they did not learn to do so during graduate school. In this alternative 
account, the propensity is what caused them to go to graduate school in 
the first place. On this interpretation, the diagnosis task would make a 
great admissions test, given that 100 percent of the graduate students 
constructed visualizations. Of course, if the diagnosis task were used as 
an admissions test, only 18 percent of undergraduates from Stanford 
would be admitted, which seems unlikely. Our suspicion is that students 
learned to choose to make visualizations because of graduate school, not 
as a precondition for going to graduate school. 
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